Atlantic drift: venture capital performance in the UK and the US by Lerner, Josh et al.
Research report: June 2011
Atlantic Drift 
Venture capital performance in the UK and the US 
Josh Lerner, Yannis Pierrakis, Liam Collins and Albert Bravo Biosca 
NESTA is the UK’s foremost independent expert on how innovation can 
solve some of the country’s major economic and social challenges. Its work is 
enabled by an endowment, funded by the National Lottery, and it operates 
at no cost to the government or taxpayer.
NESTA is a world leader in its field and carries out its work through a blend 
of experimental programmes, analytical research and investment in early-
stage companies. www.nesta.org.uk
3Executive summary
The importance of a vibrant venture capital 
industry in supporting growth is widely 
recognised, and consequently governments 
across the world have sought to promote 
the industry. But the development of the VC 
industry in the UK (and in many other countries) 
has been hampered by the low returns it delivers 
to its investors. Understanding how the UK 
venture capital market compares with other 
ones, particularly the US market, is the first step 
towards improving the performance of the UK 
VC industry.
This report sheds further light on the 
magnitude of the performance gap between 
US and UK venture capital funds, its evolution 
over time, and what the likely drivers of the 
performance differences are. It uses a novel 
database that combines data on VC fund 
performance and their investments in the US 
and UK for 791 funds raised between 1990-
2005. Therefore, it not only reports differences 
in aggregate performance across countries, but 
in addition it compares like-for-like funds, with 
the same focus, vintage year and experience, 
but located on opposite shores of the Atlantic.
The key contribution of this study to the 
debate on venture capital fund performance in 
the UK is thus twofold: first, it aims to identify 
key factors that are associated with VC fund 
performance, and second, to examine if any 
of these factors may explain the performance 
difference between UK and US-based funds. 
The report thus provides useful insights 
to investors determining their asset class 
allocation and selecting which VC funds to 
invest in, VC fund managers choosing their 
investment strategy and fund structure and, 
finally, policymakers aiming to support the 
development of the VC industry. 
Key findings 
1. The returns performance of UK and US VC 
funds in recent years has been very similar. 
UK funds have historically underperformed 
US funds, but this gap has significantly 
narrowed. The gap in fund returns (net 
IRR) between the average US and UK fund 
has fallen from over 20 percentage points 
before the dotcom bubble (funds raised 
in 1990-1997) to one percentage point 
afterwards (funds raised in 1998-2005). 
However, this convergence has been driven 
by declining returns in the US after the 
burst of the dotcom bubble, rather than 
by increasing returns in the UK. Average 
returns for funds raised after the bubble 
in both the UK and the US have been 
relatively poor, but VC performance is 
likely to move upwards as VC funds start to 
cash out their investments in social media 
companies (particularly in the US).
2. The wider environment in which UK funds 
and the companies they finance operate 
was a major contributor to the historical gap 
in VC returns. While there are some large 
differences in the observable characteristics 
of VC funds between both countries, they 
cannot account for the historical returns 
gap. 
3. Average returns obscure the large 
variability in returns within countries. The 
dispersion in returns across funds was 
highest during the pre-bubble years, and 
has fallen significantly since then. But in 
both periods the gap in returns between 
good and bad performing funds within 
a country was much larger than the gap 
in the average returns across countries. 
Thirteen per cent of UK funds established 
4since 1990, would have got into the top 
quartile of US funds by returns (this is 22 
per cent for funds established in the post 
bubble period), while 45 per cent of UK 
funds outperformed the median US fund. 
Selecting the right fund manager is thus 
more important than choosing a particular 
country.
4. The strongest quantifiable predictors of 
VC returns performance are (a) whether 
the fund managers’ prior funds had 
outperformed the market benchmark; 
(b) whether the fund invests in early 
rounds; (c) whether the fund managers 
have relatively more prior experience; 
and (d) whether the fund is optimally 
sized (neither too big nor too small). 
Moreover, historical performance has been 
higher for funds located in one of the 
four largest investor hubs (Silicon Valley, 
New York, Massachusetts and London) 
and for investments in information and 
communication technology.
5. UK government-backed funds have 
historically underperformed their private 
counterparts, but the gap between public 
and private returns has narrowed in recent 
periods. This suggests that in later years 
governments have become savvier when 
designing new VC schemes.
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Venture capital has been the driving force 
behind some of the most vibrant sectors of 
the US economy.1 It is an important source of 
funding, expertise and networks for innovative 
companies (see Section 1.1). Because of this, 
a well-developed venture capital industry 
is crucial for entrepreneurs, financiers and 
policymakers alike. But the development of the 
venture capital industry around the world has 
been slow and uneven.
The first venture capital (VC) fund was created 
in the US back in 1946, but the growth of the 
US VC industry only accelerated in the late 
1970s. Across the Atlantic, the UK venture 
capital market only began to take off in the 
1980s, though 3i was also founded in 1946. 
And it was not until the late 1990s that venture 
capital started to take hold in the rest of 
Europe. Today the US continues to be home 
to the largest venture capital industry in the 
world, investing $20 billion in 2010 (Figure 1). 
In contrast, VC investments made by European-
based funds totalled only $5 billion in 2010, a 
quarter of the US level. Within Europe, the UK 
has one of the most active VC market, with UK 
funds investing $1 billion in 2010. Still, this 
only represents 0.05 per cent of UK GDP, which 
compares unfavourably to 0.14 per cent in the 
US.2 
The development of the VC industry over time 
has not been smooth either. Venture capital 
activity peaked in 2000, fuelled by an internet 
bubble that was followed by millions of dollars 
lost, hundreds of bust companies and a massive 
fall in VC activity. As the industry began to 
pick up pace again the financial crisis struck to 
reverse these gains, however Figure 1 reveals 
that in 2010 VC investments were growing 
again. 
While venture capital continues to spread 
globally, expanding in China and other 
emerging markets in recent years, questions 
are being asked about the industry’s ability 
to deliver acceptable returns in more mature 
markets. Average VC returns over the last 
decade have been low, not having recovered 
from the dotcom crash (Figure 2). Some 
observers argue this is a permanent shift 
towards lower returns, raising doubts about the 
sustainability of the VC model. However, VC 
returns have not been much different relative 
to the overall stock market since 2002, so 
recent returns may reflect the natural evolution 
of a competitive market.3 As VC funds start to 
cash out their investments in social networks, 
returns are likely to move upwards once again.
Whether European VC funds will benefit from 
this recovery is a different question. Trade 
associations and VC professionals have long 
asserted that realised returns of venture 
investments in Europe have historically been 
lower than in the US, and pointed to this 
underperformance as the main obstacle to the 
development of a strong VC industry in the 
UK and continental Europe.4 The few empirical 
studies that provide a comparison between US 
and Europe (and the even fewer that consider 
US and UK differences) appear to support 
these claims: in all such studies the UK and 
the European venture capital industry more 
generally are perceived to be the poor cousins 
of the US industry, consistently delivering lower 
returns to their investors.5 
However, most of these studies only compare 
aggregate performance across countries, 
without considering how the characteristics 
of each individual fund and its investments 
can help explain the performance gap across 
countries.
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1. See for instance Lerner J. 
(2009) ‘Boulevard of Broken 
Dreams: Why Public Efforts 
to Boost Entrepreneurship 
and Venture Capital Have 
Failed – and What to Do 
About It.’ Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, p.248.
2. US based VC funds invested 
$20 billion and UK based 
funds £1 billion according to 
EVCA in 2010. In the same 
year, US GDP was $14,658 
trillion and the UK GDP was 
$2,247 trillion (nominal, IMF 
data). 
3. For a detailed discussion 
see Kedrosky, P. (2009) 
‘Right-Sizing the U.S. Venture 
Capital Industry.’ Kansas 
City: Kauffman Foundation; 
and Kaplan, N. and Lerner, 
J. (2010) It Ain’t Broke: The 
Past, Present, and the Future 
of Venture Capital. ‘Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance.’ 
Vol.22, No.2, pp.36-47. 
4. Hege, U., Palomino, F. and 
Schwienbacher, A. (2009) 
Venture Capital Performance: 
The Disparity Between Europe 
and the United States. ‘Revue 
de l’association française de 
finance.’ Vol.30, No. 1/2009, 
p.7-50. 
5. See Box 1 for a literature 
review of empirical studies on 
venture capital performance. 
Part I: Introduction
7This report aims to fill this gap, focusing 
on the performance difference between UK 
and US funds and its evolution over time. 
Specifically, we compare the returns in the 
US and the UK of like-for-like funds, with 
the same focus, vintage year and experience, 
among other factors, and explore whether 
some of these factors may explain the UK’s 
underperformance. To do so, we build a new 
database that matches fund level performance 
records with individual investments made by 
these funds, covering 791 funds raised in the 
UK and the US between 1990-2005 (See Box 
2 for a description of the database and the 
sources used to build it).
The second aim of this report is to identify 
which factors are associated with better VC 
fund performance in the UK. Most of the 
literature that has explored the drivers of VC 
returns has only used data for US funds.6 We 
examine whether the same factors explain 
performance on both shores of the Atlantic, 
and how the impact of these factors has 
evolved over time.
Finally, the success of venture capital and 
the potential benefits that it can bring into 
an economy have not been left unnoticed by 
policymakers, and thus several governments 
around the world have attempted to stimulate 
VC activity. Therefore we also consider the 
relative performance of publicly backed venture 
capital funds in an attempt to assess the role of 
government in this area.
6. See Box 1. 
Figure 1: Venture capital investment by US, UK and continental European funds by year
Note: Only VC investments included (Seed, Early-Stage, Expansion, Later-Stage). Source: Thomson One for US and EVCA for Continental Europe and the UK. 
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8Figure 2: Venture capital industry performance by vintage year (US, UK and continental 
Europe)
Source: Thomson One. 
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1.1 The contribution of venture capital 
to innovation and economic growth 
The provision of suitable finance to high-
growth companies requires the presence 
of effective financial systems that support 
innovation and growth. Bank finance is by far 
the main source of finance for most businesses 
in developed economies.7 The majority of 
firms accessing finance rely on small-scale 
debt finance: credit cards, overdrafts, and 
commercial loans. Only a small proportion of 
UK businesses seeking external finance receives 
venture capital (3 per cent). A natural question 
is why venture capital is important if only such 
a small proportion of firms use it. Empirical 
evidence on the significance of venture capital 
for innovation and growth is available at the 
following three levels. 
Venture capital and firms
Venture capitalists provide several critical 
services in addition to providing finance, such 
as helping the company to raise more finance, 
reviewing and helping to formulate business 
strategy, filling in the management team and 
introducing them to potential customers and 
suppliers.8 Venture capitalists carefully screen 
firms and structure contracts to strengthen 
incentives and monitor firms,9 promote their 
professionalisation and induce them to behave 
more aggressively. Gompers and Lerner (2001) 
write that venture capital helps entrepreneurial 
firms to invest more than they would otherwise, 
to grow more quickly, and sustain performance 
in the long term – even after going public.10 
Chemmanur and Loutskina (2005) found that 
venture capitalists attract a greater number 
and higher quality of market participants such 
as underwriters, institutional investors, and 
analysts to an IPO, thus obtaining a higher 
valuation for the IPOs of firms backed by them. 
They also found some evidence that suggests 
that venture capitalists are able to either select 
better quality firms to back (screening), or help 
7. CBR (2008) ‘Financing UK 
Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises: the 2007 Survey.’ 
Cambridge: CBR.
8. Gorman M. and Sahlman, 
W. (1989) What do venture 
capitalists do? ‘Journal of 
Business Venturing.’ Volume 
4, Issue 4, July 1989, pp.231-
248.
9. Kaplan, S.N. and Stromberg, 
P. (20010 Venture capitalists 
as principals: contracting, 
screening, and monitoring. 
‘American Economic Review.’ 
(Papers and Proceedings) 91, 
pp.426-430.
10. Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. 
(2001) The Venture Capital 
Revolution. ‘Journal of 
Economic Perspectives.’ 
Volume 15, Number 2, 
Spring 2001, pp.145-168.
11. Chemmanur, T. and 
Loutskina, E. (2006) ‘The 
Role of Venture Capital 
Backing in Initial Public 
Offerings: Certification, 
Screening, or Market 
Power?’ EFA 2005 Moscow 
Meetings Paper. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=604882.
12. Sorenson, O. and Stuart, 
T. (2001) Syndication 
Networks and the Spatial 
Distribution of Venture 
Capital Investments. 
‘American Journal of 
Sociology.’ 106, pp.1546-86.
13. Lerner, J. and Schoar,A. 
(2005) Does Legal 
Enforcement Affect 
Financial Transactions? 
The Contractual Channel 
in Private Equity. ‘The 
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics.’ 120 (1), 
pp.223-246.
9create such higher quality firms by adding value 
to them (monitoring) in the pre-IPO stage.11 
Knowledge regarding the target company’s 
industry allows the venture capitalist to 
oversee investments more efficiently and more 
effectively, in part because industry experience 
enhances the venture capitalist’s ability to 
recognise signs of trouble at an early stage.12 
As a consequence, venture capital has become 
an important source of funding for a significant 
number of innovative companies, not only in 
the United States, but also increasingly around 
the world.13 
Venture capital and innovation
The role of venture capital in economic 
development is increasingly recognised 
as central to the development of an 
entrepreneurial economy.14 There is an 
emerging consensus that venture capital is a 
key component of the innovation process15 
and that it plays a crucial role in ‘new economy 
innovation systems’ formed by highly dynamic 
sets of interrelationships between VCs, market 
conditions and new firm incubators.16 
On the basis of his study of the Internet 
industry in the US, Zook (2005) concludes 
that: “financial institutions of innovation 
are probably more important for economic 
growth in this knowledge economy than the 
location of research universities”.17 Kenney 
and Florida (1988) argue that VCs play a key 
role within regional innovation networks and 
act as catalysts or ‘technological gatekeepers’ 
who facilitate and direct innovations within 
localised clusters18 making it the ‘’most 
important institution supporting technology 
entrepreneurship’’.19 
A variety of studies suggest that venture-
backed firms are responsible for a 
disproportionate number of patents and new 
technologies,20 and they bring more radical 
innovations to market faster than lower-growth 
businesses that rely on other types of finance.21 
In fact, venture capital has played a unique 
role in the information and commercialisation 
of entire new industries.22 In the case of 
biotechnology for example, “it is safe to say 
that without venture capital and regional 
agglomeration, the industry would not exist in 
the form that it does today”.23 
Venture capital and employment growth 
The evidence from the US, where venture 
activity has a longer pedigree, is compelling. 
A study undertaken by Puri and Zarutskie 
(2008) found that despite the extremely small 
proportion of VC-backed firms (0.1 per cent 
of all new firms created between 1981 and 
2001) they accounted for nearly 10 per cent 
of employment in the US in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Chemmanur, Krishnan and 
Nandy (2009) also show that VC-backed firms 
have higher levels of productivity compared 
to non VC-backed firms. Hence, VC is widely 
perceived to be an engine of growth for the 
economy. The question that arises is why other 
sources of business finance cannot borrow or 
duplicate such features and processes of the 
venture capital industry. Hall and Lerner (2010) 
summarise these reasons as follows:
“Economists have suggested several 
explanations for the apparent superiority of 
venture funds in this regard. First, because 
regulations limit banks’ ability to hold 
shares, at least in the US, they cannot freely 
use equity. Second, banks may not have the 
necessary skills to evaluate projects with 
few collateralizable assets and significant 
uncertainty. Finally, venture funds’ high-
powered compensation schemes give 
venture capitalists incentives to monitor 
firms closely. Banks sponsoring venture 
funds without high-powered incentives have 
found it difficult to retain personnel”.24  
14. Mason C. and Harrison, R. 
(2002) The geography of 
venture capital investments 
in the UK.’ ‘Transactions 
of the Institute of British 
Geographers.’ Vol.27, Issue 
4, pp.427-451.
15. Powell, W., Koput, K., 
Bowie, J. and Smith-Doerr, 
L. (2002) The Spatial 
Clustering of Science and 
Capital: Accounting for 
Biotech Firm-Venture Capital 
Relationships. ‘Regional 
Studies.’ Vol.36.3, pp.291-
305.
16. Cooke, P. (2001) ‘Knowledge 
Economies: Clusters, 
learning and cooperative 
advantage.’ London, New 
York: Routledge.
17. Zook, M.A. (2005) ‘The 
Geography of the Internet 
Industry: Venture Capital, 
Dot-coms and Local 
Knowledge.’ Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, p.6.
18.  Florida, R.L. and Kenney, 
M. (1988) Venture capital-
financed innovation and 
technological change in the 
USA. ‘Research Policy.’ 17, 
pp.119-137.
19. See Saxenian, A. and Sabel, 
C. (2008) Roepke Lecture 
in Economic Geography 
– Venture Capital in the 
‘Periphery’: The New 
Argonauts, Global Search, 
and Local Institution 
Building. ‘Economic 
Geography.’ Vol.84, Issue 4, 
pp.379-394.
20. Kortum, S. and Lerner, 
J. (2000) Assessing the 
contribution of venture 
capital to innovation. ‘RAND 
Journal of Economics.’ 
Vol.31, No.4, pp.674-692; 
also Mann, J.R. and Sager, 
W.T. (2007) Patents, venture 
capital, and software start-
ups. ‘Research Policy.’ 36, 
pp.193-208.
21. See Hellmann, T. and Puri, 
M. (2000) The interaction 
between product market and 
financing strategy: the role 
of Venture Capital. ‘Review 
of Financial Studies.’ 13, 
pp.959-984; also Gompers, 
P. and Lerner, J. (2001) The 
Venture Capital Revolution. 
‘Journal of Economic 
Perspectives.’ Volume 15, 
Number 2, Spring 2001, 
pp.145-168.
22. Bygrave, W.B. and Timmons, 
J.A. (1992) ‘Venture 
Capital at the Crossroads.’ 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
23. Powell, W., Koput, K., 
Bowie, J. and Smith-Doerr, 
L. (2002) The Spatial 
Clustering of Science and 
Capital: Accounting for 
Biotech Firm-Venture Capital 
Relationships. ‘Regional 
Studies.’ Vol.36.3, pp.291-
305, p.304.
24. Hall, B. and Lerner, J. (2010) 
‘The financing of R&D and 
innovation.’ United Nations 
University, UNU Merit, 
Working Paper Series 2010-
012. Maastricht: UNU. p.34.
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Box 1: Related literature 
As more data has become available 
in recent years, more studies have, 
in various ways, analysed both the 
gross performance at the deal level for 
venture capital investments or the net 
performance at the fund level. Several 
studies are concerned with data selection 
bias correction methodologies and 
they use individual funding rounds to 
compute the performance of private 
equity investments relative to the equity 
markets (Peng, 2001;25 Woodward and Hall, 
2004;26 Cochrane, 2005;27 Gottschalg and 
Phalippou, 200928). 
A few empirical studies have looked not 
only at the performance of venture capital 
funds but also tried to understand what 
factors may affect such performance. 
Gompers and Lerner (1998)29 used data 
on IPO exits to demonstrate that fund 
performance is driven by factors such 
as scale, geography, fund management 
skills, persistence of performance (i.e. 
certain funds consistently outperform the 
market) and specialisation of funds. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005)30 used a data set of 
individual fund performance collected by 
Venture Economics (now Thomson One) 
and fund characteristics, and found that 
returns persist strongly across subsequent 
funds of a partnership and better 
performing partnerships are more likely to 
raise follow-on funds and larger funds. 
Other academic studies added an additional 
dimension to the literature by examining 
fund performance differences across 
countries, mostly comparing Europe to the 
US. Gottschalg et al. (2004)31 considered 
fund-level performance measures for 
private equity funds in the US and 
Europe and found that funds in Europe 
underperform their US peers. Hege et al. 
(2003)32 showed that US VC firms as a rule 
reach significantly higher performance on 
average in terms of IRR than their European 
counterparts. Hege et al. (2009)33 also used 
Venture Economics to compare the success 
of venture capital investment in the US and 
in Europe between 1997-2003 by analysing 
individual venture-backed companies and 
the value generated within the financing 
process. Their research identified a gap 
between the value generated by US 
venture capital investments and European 
investments that is statistically highly 
significant and very large in economic 
terms. Finally, reports from the British 
Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and 
the European Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA) also confirm the European 
underperformance relative to the US.34,35  
The findings of this report are generally 
consistent with these studies. However, 
our study differs from previous work in 
several counts. First, several of these 
studies examine the private equity industry 
as a whole while we focus solely on the 
VC industry (only carefully selected VC 
funds have been included). Second, most 
of these studies have overwhelmingly 
US-based samples and when they include 
a cross country performance comparison 
they normally focus on the US and Europe. 
In contrast, our main focus is the UK and a 
cross country comparison between the UK 
and the US. Third, most studies look either 
at investments at the portfolio-company 
level or at returns at the fund level. We 
use fund level performance records and 
individual investments made by these funds 
to guide our empirical investigation. Finally, 
most of the previous studies only compare 
aggregate performance across countries, 
without considering how the characteristics 
of each individual fund and its investments 
can help explain the performance gap 
across countries.
25. Peng, L. (2001) ‘Building a 
Venture Capital Index.’ Yale 
ICF Working Paper No. 00-
51. New Haven, CT: Yale ICF.
26. Woodward, S.E. and Hall, 
R.E. (2004) Benchmarking 
the Returns to Venture.’ 
NBER Working Paper No. 
10202. Cambridge, MA: 
NBER.
27. Cochrane J. (2009) The 
risk and return of venture 
capital. ‘Journal of Financial 
Economics.’ 75 (2005), 
pp.3-52.
28. Phalippou, L. and 
Gottschalg, O. (2009) The 
Performance of Private 
Equity Funds. ‘The Review 
of Financial Studies.’ 22(4), 
pp.1747-1776.
29. Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. 
(1998) ‘What Drives Venture 
Capital Fundraising?’ 
Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, July 
1998, pp.149-192. 
Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution.
30. Kaplan, S.N. and Schoar, 
A. (2005) Private Equity 
Performance: Returns, 
Persistence and Capital 
Flows. ‘Journal of Finance.’ 
60, pp.1791-1823.
31. Gottschalg, O., Phalippou, 
L. and Zollo, M. (2004) 
‘Performance of Private 
Equity Funds: Another 
Puzzle?’ Working Paper. 
Fontainbleau: INSEAD.
32. Hege, U., Palomino, F. And 
Schwienbacher, A. (2003) 
‘Determinants of Venture 
Capital Performance: Europe 
and the United States.’ 
RICAFE-LSE Working Paper 
No 001. London: RICAFE-
LSE.
33. Hege, U., Palomino, F. 
and Schwienbacher, A. 
(2009) Venture Capital 
Performance: The Disparity 
Between Europe and the 
United States. ‘Revue de 
l’association française 
de finance.’ Vol.30, No. 
1/2009, p.7-50.
34. EVCA (2009) ‘Final Figures 
– 2009 Performance Survey.’ 
Brussels: EVCA.
35. BVCA (2010) ‘Private 
Equity and Venture Capital 
Performance Measurement 
Survey 2009.’ London: 
BVCA. 
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Box 2: Data sources and sample construction 
The main challenge when undertaking 
research on venture capital is the 
availability of suitable data, especially 
fund performance data, since partners are 
typically not subject to public disclosure 
requirements.36 To overcome this challenge, 
several data sources have been used for 
this study. The result is a novel database 
that combines data on US and UK VC 
fund37 performance and their investments 
anywhere in the world. The data collection 
required considerable time and effort, but 
resulted in a dataset that is significantly 
larger and more comprehensive than other 
fund-level performance datasets on venture 
capital in the UK.
This combination of data from a variety 
of sources created a database of 5,850 
VC funds established between 1990 and 
2009, and details of around 133,000 
individual investments made to over 33,000 
companies based around the world. We 
restrict the analysis of VC returns to funds 
with vintage year between 1990 and 2005. 
Funds raised post 2005 were dropped as 
they are unlikely to have had time to exit 
their investments yet, resulting in fund 
returns data that is either missing or based 
on very early estimates. We also collect data 
for funds in continental Europe, although 
they are not included in our analysis on VC 
performance as the proportionally small 
sample of funds reporting net IRR and 
multiples was unlikely to be representative 
of the market. We do however include 
continental European funds when looking 
at funds’ characteristics and their ability to 
bring companies to a successful exit, as the 
number of funds reporting this information 
is much larger. Finally, our database also 
includes hand-collected data on the 
number of partners and offices that each 
fund had when it was raised, extracted from 
industry directories. Further information on 
the database is included in the appendix of 
the report.
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36. Hellman, T. and Puri, M. 
(2002) Venture Capital 
and the Professionalization 
of Start-ups: Empirical 
Evidence. ‘Journal of 
Finance.’ 57, pp.169-197; 
also McKenzie, M.D. and 
Janeway, W.H. (2008) 
‘Venture capital fund 
performance and the IPO 
market.’ CFAP Working 
Papers, No.30. Cambridge: 
Centre for Financial Analysis 
& Policy.
37. The nationality of the fund 
is defined as the country 
where the fund manager is 
based. Note that throughout 
the report ‘fund manager’ is 
used to refer to the venture 
capital firm that manages 
the fund, also known as the 
GP or general partner. 
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A natural question is whether the sample 
of funds with performance data is 
representative of the wider population of 
funds, given that we only have performance 
data for 791 funds. We follow a number of 
steps to mitigate these concerns. First, we 
compare our performance metrics to the 
returns provided by Thomson One, the most 
comprehensive source of aggregate returns 
for the VC industry (even if also incomplete; 
for a critique see Maats, et al. (2011)38). As 
seen in Figure A2 in the appendix, the IRRs 
in the UK and the US follow similar patterns 
over time regardless of the source used. 
Second, we compare the characteristics of 
funds for which we have performance data 
to the funds for which this is not available. 
We identify several differences between 
both samples, reported in Table A3 in the 
appendix. For instance, funds reporting 
performance data tend to be larger, from 
more established GPs, from earlier vintage 
years and invest larger amounts in more 
companies. However, these differences 
appear both in the US and the UK samples, 
so they are unlikely to bias the estimates for 
the returns gap. Moreover, the econometric 
analysis controls for these factors as 
well. There is only one difference worth 
discussing in more detail. As seen in Table 
A3, it appears that our performance sample 
oversamples funds with a higher share of 
IPO exits in the UK while it undersamples 
them in the US, which suggests that we 
may be underestimating the magnitude 
of the returns gap. The share of IPO exits 
is an imperfect proxy of performance, but 
we try different methods to exploit this 
information to correct our estimates (i.e., 
weighting and imputing) and find similar 
patterns under these corrections.
38. Maats, F., Metrick, A., 
Yasuda, A., Hinkes, B. 
and Vershouski, S. (2011) 
‘On the consistency and 
Reliability of Venture Capital 
Databases.’ Working Paper.  
New Haven, CT: Yale School 
of Management.
The US VC industry continues to be more 
developed than the European VC industry, even 
though both venture capital industries follow 
similar cycles. In this section we ask whether 
differences go beyond the aggregate size of 
the market, examining fund characteristics in 
the UK, the US and continental Europe. We 
focus the discussion on a few selected factors, 
but include more detailed information on 
several other characteristics in the appendix.39 
2.1  There are some large differences in 
fund characteristics across countries, 
and they are robust over time
US funds are larger than European funds, and 
the gap has not narrowed much over time. 
Funds raised between 2006 and 2009, the 
most recent year for which we have data, are 
larger in real terms than funds raised during 
1990-2005, the main study period. But 
convergence between countries in fund size 
has been limited. Average fund size in the US 
was twice as much as in continental Europe in 
1990-2005, and continues to be 90 per cent 
higher in the most recent period.
Their larger size allows US funds to make 
twice as many investments as European funds, 
and invest larger amounts to each portfolio 
company on average, particularly relative to 
continental Europe. US funds invest in a larger 
number of companies, but also undertake a 
larger number of investments in each of the 
companies that they fund. Over 1990-2005, US 
funds invested in follow-up rounds in roughly 
40 per cent of their portfolio companies, which 
compares to only about 20 per cent in the 
UK and continental Europe. There are also 
differences in their syndication practices. US 
funds tend to invest with a larger number of 
co-investors than UK and continental European 
funds (Table 1). 
2.2 US funds are more specialised, 
concentrating investment in fewer 
sectors
Figure 3 shows the proportion of capital 
invested by all funds in our sample across nine 
broad industries.40, 41 The left panel presents the 
allocation of capital for funds established in the 
1990-2005 period and the right panel focuses 
on the most recent funds, established in 2006-
2009. In the earlier period the industry defined 
as internet/computers received the highest 
share of investment in all three examined 
geographical regions. Biotech/healthcare and 
communications/electronics were the next most 
preferred industries. The remaining industries 
received considerably smaller proportions of 
investments. If we look at funds raised in the 
most recent period (2006-2009), there has 
been a shift of investment away from internet/
computers, even if this industry continues to 
top the ranking. 
US funds had, and continue to have, a much 
larger focus on internet/computers and 
communications/electronics when compared 
with European funds, which instead invest 
relatively larger proportions in other sectors 
such as business/industrial and consumer. 
European funds also invest more on energy, a 
sector that has tripled its share of investment 
in recent years. 
There are also differences in the degree of 
sectorial specialisation across countries. Using 
a measure of the concentration of investment 
Part 2: The venture capital industry in Europe and the US
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39. See Tables A2, A3 and A4.
40. Note that figures on 
amounts invested by 
industry differ from 
those reported in the 
summary statistics tables 
in the appendix. The 
values discussed here 
refer to proportion of the 
aggregate amount of VC 
investment allocated to each 
industry, while the summary 
statistics report the average 
across the sample of the 
proportion that each fund 
allocated to each industry. 
In other words, the former 
corresponds to the weighted 
average by size and the 
latter reports an unweighted 
average.
41. The original sample of 
investments was classified 
into 69 separate industry 
segments as defined by 
Thomson One. We follow 
Gompers et al. (2008) 
approach and we assign all 
investments into nine broad 
industry classes: Internet and 
Computers; Communications 
and Electronics; Business 
and Industrial; Consumer; 
Energy; Biotech and 
Healthcare; Financial 
Services; Business Services; 
and all other (see Gompers 
P., Kovner A., Lerner J. 
and Scharfstein, D. (2008) 
Venture Capital Investment 
Cycles: The Impact of 
Public Markets. ‘Journal of 
Financial Economics.’ 87 
(2008), pp.1-23 for further 
information). 
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in an industry or a group of industries,42 we 
find that US funds are more specialised than 
both UK and continental European funds. 
Specialisation may be a more difficult strategy 
in Europe given the higher fragmentation 
of the European VC market, although in the 
most recent years (2006-2009) we observe a 
trend towards higher specialisation in all three 
markets (Table 1).
2.3 European funds are more 
internationalised than US funds
Most US funds have traditionally only invested 
locally, with less than a third of US funds raised 
between 1990 and 2005 having invested in 
one or more companies outside the US (Figure 
4a).43 In contrast, the majority of European 
funds have invested outside of their home 
market.44 This reflects the smaller size of home 
markets across Europe and, encouragingly, 
the ability of European funds to overcome, at 
least partially, this constraint and invest across 
borders. 
Figure 4b reports the location of investments 
broken up by the fund’s nationality. Less than 
20 per cent of US funds raised between 1990 
and 2005 made an investment in a European 
company, while about 40 per cent of European 
funds (both in the UK and the continent) have 
invested in the US. 
The strong geographical preference of US 
funds for investing in the US becomes even 
clearer when we consider the amounts invested 
in each market (Figure 4c).45 Ninety-one per 
cent of all US VC capital raised between 1990 
and 2005 stayed in the US, while less than 5 
per cent went to Europe. In contrast, only 47 
per cent of all capital invested by the UK funds 
went to UK companies, while as much as 20 per 
cent went to the US and another 20 per cent 
was invested in continental Europe. Finally, 
continental European funds invested a large 
proportion of their funds in the US (17 per 
cent), but only 5 per cent in the UK. 
The situation has changed somewhat in recent 
times. A higher proportion of European funds 
raised in 2006-2009 have chosen to invest 
locally while US-based funds are becoming 
more global. As a result, the proportion of 
European VC capital being invested in the US 
has halved, falling to 10 per cent, and a slightly 
larger share of US VC capital is coming to 
Europe.
Overall, this analysis suggests that Europe did 
not offer an attractive proposition to US VC 
funds. Europe has a less developed VC market 
than the US, so attracting US funds (their 
 
Table 1: Key Summary Statistics
  Fund Vintage Year 1990-2005   Fund Vintage Year 2006-2009
             Mean            Median              Mean            Median
 US UK CE US UK CE US UK CE US UK CE
Fund Size (USD millions) 163.26 142.20 78.19 67.51 46.92 38.47 171.14 148.37 93.41 76.50 57.24 43.70
Number of investments made 31.87 16.95 14.82 18 8 9 15.38 8.66 9.15 8 4 5
Average investment size 2.98 3.78 2.22 1.81 1.90 1.60 3.76 4.93 3.29 2.02 2.26 1.95 
(USD millions)
Number of companies invested in 15.88 11.48 10.48 11 7 7 8.48 5.94 6.74 5 4 4
Average amount invested in each 4.71 4.60 2.86 3.03 2.38 2.09 5.18 5.93 3.98 3.08 3.00 2.30 
company
Proportion of companies 0.38 0.18 0.22 0.38 0.12 0.17 0.34 0.21 0.17 0.33 0.04 0 
receiving multiple investments
Average number of investors 4.14 2.92 3.05 4.06 2.74 2.72 3.53 2.93 2.04 3.39 3 1.45 
involved in a deal
Specialisation index 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.5 0.38 0.44 0.65 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.5 0.5
42. Specifically, specialisation 
is measured as a Herfindahl 
index constructed using 
the number of investments 
made into each industry. 
The higher the index, the 
more specialised a fund is. 
Intuitively, the Herfindahl 
index measures the 
probability that, if you were 
to take two investments 
from a VC portfolio at 
random, they would be in 
the same industry.
43. Differences in the coverage 
of investment activity across 
countries in the earlier 
years could potentially 
impact some of the 
comparisons on investment 
flows across countries, but 
the fact that differences 
remain in the later years 
despite improved coverage 
supports the findings on 
internationalisation.
44. Note that the results for 
continental Europe need 
to be interpreted with care, 
since the codification does 
not consider funds that only 
invest within continental 
Europe as internationalised, 
even if they invest in 
multiple countries within the 
continent.
45. Note that figures on 
amounts invested by region 
differ from those reported in 
the summary statistics tables 
in the appendix. The values 
discussed here refer to 
proportion of the aggregate 
amount of VC investment 
allocated to each region, 
while the summary statistics 
report the average across 
the sample of the proportion 
that each fund allocated to 
each region. In other words, 
the former corresponds to 
the weighted average by 
size and the latter reports an 
unweighted average.
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Figure 3: Venture capital investment by industry and vintage year (UK, US and 
continental Europe)  
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Figure 4: The geography of investments by region of the fund (UK, US and continental Europe)
(A)
(B)
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money but also, crucially, their expertise) ought 
to benefit European economies. Instead, the 
opposite is happening. A much larger share of 
European VC funds invest in the US than the 
other way around. While Europe is likely to 
benefit from its funds investing in the US (for 
the returns it provides, the network it builds 
and the experience it generates), the small flow 
in the opposite direction is a cause for concern. 
The analysis also shows that the UK has 
become an attractive destination to domicile 
venture capital funds, building on its strong 
financial industry. This has made it easier for 
London to become a global hub for venture 
capital funds.
2.4 The global venture capital industry 
is concentrated in very few hubs
Information about potential investment 
opportunities generally circulates within 
geographic and industry spaces.46 This makes 
it advantageous for fund managers to locate 
near each other and close to agglomerations of 
high potential entrepreneurs. As a result, four  
geographical areas, Silicon Valley, New York, 
Massachusetts and London, hosted 40 per cent 
of all VC funds launched in the US and Europe 
between 1990 and 2005 (Figure 5). This is 
discussed further in Section 4.4.
Figure 5: Venture capital funds raised in 1990-2005 by city-region 
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46. Sorenson, O. and Stuart, 
T. (2001) Syndication 
Networks and the Spatial 
Distribution of Venture 
Capital Investments. 
‘American Journal of 
Sociology.’ 106, pp.1546-86.
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Observers have argued that the low returns 
delivered by European VC funds to their 
investors are a major factor hampering the 
development of the VC industry in the UK 
and continental Europe. This section aims to 
understand the magnitude of this performance 
gap, its evolution over time, and what potential 
factors may explain it.
3.1 UK funds have historically 
underperformed US funds, but the gap 
has narrowed
We consider two different metrics of VC fund 
performance, fund multiples and the internal 
rate of return. The fund multiple corresponds 
to the amount that investors receive from the 
fund relative to the amount that they had 
originally contributed.47 However, multiples 
do not take into account the time value of 
money: a fund which pays back investors after 
12 years has the same multiple as one which 
does so after two years, even though investors 
would much prefer the latter. Therefore we 
also use the internal rate of return (IRR), which 
takes account of this and is thus our preferred 
metric.48 Performance data is only available for 
a subset of funds, so we restrict the analysis 
in this section to the UK and the US, since the 
data on these regions is the most complete.49 
Figure 6 reports the average performance of 
funds raised in the UK and the US between 
1990 and 2005, broken in two periods. 
Whether we look at IRRs or multiples a clear 
UK-US gap arises for funds raised before the 
dotcom bubble. The average IRR for funds 
with vintage year 1990-1997 is 33 per cent 
in the US and 13 per cent in the UK. That is, 
returns for pre-bubble funds in the UK were 
20 percentage points lower than in the US. 
Multiples display the same patterns. US VC 
funds raised in 1990-1997 returned to their 
investors 181 per cent more than their original 
investment on average, compared to UK funds 
which only managed to return an additional 66 
per cent to their investors (2.81 vs. 1.66). 
But this gap in returns has narrowed 
significantly since the bubble burst. Funds with 
vintage year 1998-2005 in the US reported 
IRRs of -0.21 per cent on average, compared 
to -1.21 per cent in the UK, a difference 
of 1 percentage point. Multiples have also 
converged (1.05 vs. 1). 
The volatility of fund returns becomes even 
clearer when looking at Figure 7, which 
illustrates the performance of VC funds by 
vintage year and location. Funds raised in 
the years before the dotcom crash performed 
well, while returns for funds that followed 
have been close to zero. This dynamic is quite 
typical of the venture capital industry, which 
is very sensitive to business cycles and public 
market dynamics, and tends to display a large 
cyclicality in returns.50 
VC returns have followed a similar pattern in 
the UK and the US over the sample period, 
although there are two significant but related 
differences. First, returns in the UK did not 
grow as fast as they did in the US in the run-up 
to the dotcom bubble, and as a result the UK 
was proportionally less affected by the dotcom 
crash that followed. Second, the magnitude 
of the UK-US returns gap has changed over 
time, and the gap appears to have almost 
closed for funds raised after 1997. However, 
the convergence of returns has not been driven 
by UK funds becoming better, but by the 
worsening performance of US funds. 
Part 3: The performance of venture capital funds 
47. Specifically, ‘multiple’ is 
defined as the ratio between 
the total value that the 
LP has derived from its 
interest in the partnership, 
i.e. distributed cash and 
securities plus the value of 
the LP’s remaining interest 
in the partnership, and its 
total cash investment in the 
partnership, expressed as a 
multiple. It is important to 
note that this measure does 
not reflect the time value 
of money, and therefore 
will not show whether one 
partnership has returned 
value to LPs more quickly or 
more slowly than another. 
However, it is one measure 
of ‘profit’ or ‘loss’ for the LP.
48. Specifically, we use net 
IRR, which corresponds to 
the discount rate where 
the present value of 
future cash flows of an 
investment is equal to the 
cost of the investment 
after management fees and 
carried interest have been 
accounted.
49. See Box 2 for further 
discussion. Performance data 
as per last quarter 2009.
50. See for instance Gottschalg, 
O., Phalippou, L. and Zollo, 
M. (2004) ‘Performance 
of Private Equity Funds: 
Another Puzzle?’ Working 
Paper. Fontainbleau: 
INSEAD; also Gompers P., 
Kovner A., Lerner J. and 
Scharfstein, D. (2008) 
Venture Capital Investment 
Cycles: The Impact of 
Public Markets. ‘Journal of 
Financial Economics.’ 87 
(2008), pp.1-23.
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Figure 6: Average performance of UK and US venture capital funds
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Figure 7: Performance of UK and US venture capital funds by vintage year
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3.2 The historical UK-US returns gap 
cannot be explained by observable fund 
characteristics
As seen in Section 2, there are some important 
differences in the characteristics of venture 
capital funds in the US and the UK. We next 
ask whether these differences can help explain 
the UK-US performance gap. In other words, 
we examine whether the UK-US gap in average 
returns is explained by (a) differences in the 
characteristics of the VC industry between 
countries (e.g., the US having larger funds) or 
(b) differences in the returns that funds with 
exactly the same characteristics achieve in each 
country (e.g., large UK funds doing worse than 
large US funds).
We use regression analysis to examine how the 
UK-US returns gap changes when we control 
for factors related to the characteristics of 
the fund, its managers and its investments, 
and test how statistically significant any 
remaining differences are. We split the sample 
into four periods (1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-
2001, and 2002-2005) to examine how the 
returns gap has evolved over time. This also 
has the advantage of smoothing some of the 
year-on-year fluctuations in returns typical of 
the venture capital industry. Table A5 in the 
appendix presents the results of this analysis, 
which is summarised in Figure 8.51 
Each bar represents the magnitude of the UK-
US returns gap in each period when a set of 
controls has been included in the regression. 
As in Figure 7, we also observe a narrowing 
of the gap between UK and US funds returns 
over time. While before the dotcom bubble, the 
UK-US gap in annual returns averaged between 
15 and 20 percentage points, this gap fell to 
negligible levels after the dotcom crash, and 
it is no longer statistically significant. Figure 
8 also provides evidence on what factors may 
explain both the existence of the UK-US gap 
in returns and its convergence in most recent 
periods. We discuss them one-by-one next.
The first bar in Figure 8 reports the gap 
in performance for UK and US funds with 
the same vintage year.52 It shows that UK 
funds underperformed US funds, even after 
controlling for the year in which the fund was 
established. Therefore the time of fundraising 
does not explain the historical gap in returns. 
The second bar controls in addition for the size 
of the fund and its investment stage focus, but 
the magnitude of the gap remains basically 
unchanged.53 
We next consider whether these performance 
differences are driven by the industries in 
which funds from the two countries chose to 
invest.54 We find that two funds with exactly 
the same industry exposure would still have 
performed differently across both shores of the 
Atlantic. Therefore, the UK VC funds historical 
underperformance is not due to poor industry 
selection, but to their choice of companies 
within industries or the underperformance of 
some industries in the UK. 
We continue this exercise including a set of 
extended controls associated with the fund 
manager itself, such as its prior experience 
relative to the other managers in the market, 
and its strategic choices, such as the number 
of companies they invest in, the average 
round in which they first invest in a company, 
the amount they commit, the number of 
co-investors in the round (i.e. the extent of 
syndication), and an index that measures 
how industrially specialised the fund is.55 In a 
nutshell, the inclusion of these controls does 
not narrow the gap either.56 Overall, the gap in 
the earlier periods remains when like-for-like 
funds are compared.
Finally, we ask whether the historical returns 
gap is the result of a lack of exits in the UK, or 
instead less profitable exits. As shown in the 
last bar in Figure 8, the gap narrows when we 
control for the shares of IPO exits and M&A 
exits,57 but it still continues to be large and 
significant.58 Thus, both the smaller number 
of exits and the lower returns from these exits 
explain the historical low returns generated by 
UK VC funds.
3.3 The convergence in returns is 
not the result of changes in the 
characteristics of UK funds
Figure 8 also provides additional evidence on 
what factors explain the convergence of returns 
in the UK and US or, more precisely, which 
don’t. The collapse in the returns gap over time 
is of the same order of magnitude regardless of 
whether controls are included or not. Therefore, 
this suggests that convergence in returns has 
not been driven by changes in the observable 
characteristics of VC funds in the UK and the 
US, such as size, experience or investment 
strategy. Instead, it is most likely the result of 
changes in the wider economic environment 
(or alternatively in some unmeasured VC funds 
characteristics). 
51. Unless otherwise stated, 
the regression models 
discussed in this report 
have been estimated with 
ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The regression 
tables in the appendix 
report standard errors in 
parentheses clustered at 
the fund manager level. *, 
**, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 1 per 
cent level respectively.
52. See Table A5 columns 1-3.
53. See Table A5 column 5.
54. See Table A5 column 6.
55. See Table A5 column 8.
56. We have explored a much 
larger set of potential 
controls, such as the 
whether the fund is located 
in a hub (Table A5 column 
9), the average number of 
rounds per company, the 
average investment per 
round, the overall number 
of investments, different 
proxies for experience (such 
as fund sequence number or 
age) etc., but the conclusion 
does not change. In short, 
they fail to explain the UK-
US returns gap. 
57. Share of IPO exits refers to 
the proportion of companies 
in which the fund has 
invested that went on to 
exit through an initial public 
offering. Share of M&A exits 
is similarly constructed as 
the share of companies that 
went on to exit through an 
acquisition or merger.
58. See Table A5 column 10.
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Figure 8: UK-US performance gap by vintage period (gap relative to the US in percentage points)
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The question that remains is whether this 
convergence is permanent or will prove to 
be just transitory. One hypothesis states that 
the UK VC industry has matured, becoming 
more connected with the US and hence more 
exposed to the US market functionalities. Some 
evidence appears to support this hypothesis, 
since younger European and US VC firms are 
less different from each other than their older 
counterparts, in terms of fund characteristics, 
investments strategies and contract and 
monitoring behaviour.59,60 
In contrast, the alternative hypothesis suggests 
that performance differences are just not 
evident yet; but that they will be once the likes 
of Facebook and Twitter go public (after taking 
account of the impact of the recent exits of 
LinkedIn and Skype). The public markets for 
entrepreneurial companies have been difficult 
in recent years, so many of the most promising 
venture-backed firms in the US have chosen to 
remain privately held. Accounting conventions 
in the industry often lead to conservative 
valuations of private firms. Therefore, their 
eventual IPO may trigger large gains in the US 
funds which hold these investments, improving 
as a result the aggregate performance of US 
funds in most recent periods. 
While only time will tell which of the two 
hypotheses dominates, examining what 
explains the historical gap may shed some light 
on what is likely to happen in the future. We 
turn to this next. 
3.4 The wider UK environment was a 
major contributor to the historical gap 
in VC returns
The large difference in the returns enjoyed by 
investors in the US and the UK in the decade 
prior to the dotcom crash cannot be explained 
by a large set of controls capturing several 
characteristics of the funds, their managers and 
their strategies. In other words, a large UK-US 
returns gap remains in that period, even if we 
compare like-for-like funds. Therefore, the UK 
historical underperformance can only be the 
result of some unmeasured fund characteristics 
or the environment in which funds operated 
(for example, the number of opportunities 
available and the barriers to their development, 
the ambition and ability of entrepreneurs, the 
background of investors, other cultural issues, 
etc.).
59. See right panel in Table A2 in 
the appendix.
60. Schwienbacher, A. (2008) 
Venture capital investment 
practices in Europe and the 
United States. ‘Financial 
Markets and Portfolio 
Management.’ Vol.22, 
pp.195-217 (data on 
pp.203, 207).
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Examining the performance of funds when they 
invest in other countries can shed some light 
on whether performance differences are due to 
different fund manager characteristics or to the 
investment opportunities that they face. 
We first examine how investing more capital 
into one country as opposed to another is 
associated with fund performance. We find 
evidence that the more capital US-based funds 
committed to UK-based companies as opposed 
to the US-based companies, the worse the 
IRR and multiples they achieved.61 However, 
we only find this relationship for funds raised 
before the dotcom bubble, and not afterwards. 
In most recent years US funds investing a larger 
amount of capital in European markets have 
instead displayed higher returns.62 
A caveat to this analysis is that we cannot 
directly attribute portions of the fund 
performance to investments in any particular 
country. In other words, we do not know 
whether the negative performance of a US fund 
investing in the UK was due to its investments 
in the UK or those made anywhere else. To 
overcome this problem we analyse the success 
that funds that invest in all three markets had 
at bringing companies to an IPO exit in each 
region (UK, US and continental Europe). IPOs 
are by far the most important (and profitable) 
means for venture capitalists to exit an 
investment, and have been used as performance 
measurements in various studies.63 The share 
of portfolio companies that exited through an 
IPO thus allows us to measure a given fund’s 
performance in one region and compare it with 
its performance in other regions.
Figure 9 illustrates that both US and UK 
funds enjoyed the lowest share of IPO exits 
when investing in UK companies, while they 
achieved the highest share of IPOs in their US 
investments. The share of IPOs for UK portfolio 
companies were also somewhat lower than 
for continental Europe, despite having a less 
developed IPO market than the UK.64 Similarly, 
UK funds performed well when investing in the 
US, while US funds’ performance worsened 
when investing in Europe.65 
Figure 9: Share of IPO exits for UK and US funds investing in all  three regions  
(1990-2005)
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61. Specifically, the coefficient 
in the regression (-24.542) 
implies that a US fund 
with 100 per cent of its 
investments in the UK would 
have had a 25 percentage 
points lower net IRR than a 
fund with the same vintage 
year, size, stage and industry 
focus but fully invested in 
the US (Table A6 column 1).
62. See Table A6 column 3.
63. See Gompers P., Kovner A., 
Lerner J. and Scharfstein, 
D. (2008) Venture Capital 
Investment Cycles: The 
Impact of Public Markets. 
‘Journal of Financial 
Economics.’ 87 (2008), 
pp.1-23; also Sorensen, 
M. (2007) How smart is 
smart money? A two-
sided matching model of 
venture capital. ‘Journal of 
Finance.’ 62(6), pp.2725-
2762; also Bottazzi, L., Da 
Rin, M. and Hellmann, T. 
(2007) ’The Role of Trust 
for Investment: Evidence 
from Venture Capital.’ ECGI 
Finance Working Paper 187. 
Brussels: ECGI. 
64. We also considered the 
evolution over time, but the 
number of observations in 
some cells when we split the 
sample of funds investing 
in all three regions by 
period is too low to provide 
meaningful conclusions.
65. This last finding is 
noteworthy, since Chen 
et al. (2009) finds that 
investments outside the 
fund managers’ home city 
or state (but within the US) 
achieve better success rates 
than local investments, as 
it would be expected to 
compensate for the higher 
costs and effort involved in 
investing outside the fund’s 
local market (see Chen, 
H., Gompers, P., Kovner, A. 
and Lerner, J. (2009) ‘Buy 
Local? The Geography of 
Successful and Unsuccessful 
Venture Capital Expansion.’ 
HBS Working Paper 09-143. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School.
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This suggests that the wider UK environment 
was a major contributor to the UK’s low 
historical returns. It may also help to explain 
two facts documented in Section 2, namely 
the limited appetite of US funds to invest in 
Europe,and the large share of European VC 
capital invested in the US. And, finally, it raises 
the difficult yet important question of what are 
the factors that influence the environment in 
which young innovative companies operate. 
3.5 Differences in returns within 
countries are larger than between 
countries 
Average returns do not capture the large 
variability in returns within countries. Figure 10 
illustrates the spread of performance records 
in the UK and the US over time.66 The gap in 
returns between good and bad performing 
funds within a country is much larger than the 
gap in the average returns across countries. 
This suggests that investors can find good 
performing funds everywhere, so that selecting 
the right fund manager may be more important 
than choosing a particular country.
Looking at the distribution of returns within 
countries also allows us to examine the 
historical UK-US returns gap from a different 
angle. Was the UK’s underperformance driven 
by the extremely good performance of a small 
number of US-based funds, which experienced 
exceptionally high returns during the dotcom 
era? Or was it instead the majority of US 
funds that performed better than their UK 
counterparts, and not just a small proportion 
of them? 
The median performance of UK funds was 0.8 
per cent while for US funds it was 2 per cent 
(in others words, 50 per cent of UK funds 
had returns above 0.8 percent). Thirteen per 
cent of UK funds would have got into the top 
quartile in the US, 24 per cent of UK funds 
outperformed the average US fund and 45 per 
cent outperformed the median US fund. 
Figure 10(b) reveals that the dispersion of 
returns has been volatile over time. The range 
of returns for US funds raised between 1994 
and 1997 was large, with the vast majority of 
such funds performing well. More particularly, 
75 per cent of all US funds received positive 
returns, and more than a quarter reached 
returns above 55 per cent. In contrast the 
range of returns for UK funds was mostly 
concentrated below 10 per cent. The dispersion 
of returns for funds established between 1998 
and 2005 has been much lower, concentrated 
around zero on both sides of the Atlantic. Few 
funds appear to have done very well or very 
badly. The fall in the dispersion of returns over 
time is also clear if we examine the evolution 
of the interquartile range. The difference in net 
IRR between top and bottom quartile funds in 
the US was 40 percentage points pre-bubble 
and only 14 after. For the UK it was 22 and 13 
percentage points respectively.
These comparisons do not take in account the 
different characteristics of UK and US funds. 
Since we are interested in estimating the 
magnitude of the gap at different percentiles 
of the returns distribution (instead of just 
the average) we use a quantile regression to 
compare the returns of like-for-like funds in the 
UK and the US. We find that in the years prior 
to the dotcom boom, the very best US funds 
indeed outperformed their UK equivalents 
by a whopping 89 percentage points.67 But 
the returns for the median US fund were also 
13 percentage points higher than in the UK 
(adding additional controls leads to the similar 
conclusions). Therefore, while the outstanding 
returns of top US funds account for some of 
the performance gap in early periods, they 
do not on their own fully explain the UK’s 
underperformance in that period. 
66. Note that outliers are 
excluded from this graph. 
The central line in the box 
represents the median and 
the extremes of the box 
correspond to the percentile 
25th and 75th of the returns 
distribution. The length of 
the box thus corresponds to 
the interquartile range. 
67. This corresponds to 
difference in returns 
between the UK and the 
US at the 95th percentile 
of the returns distribution 
for funds raised in the 
1994-1997 period estimated 
using a quantile regression. 
See Table A7, which uses 
a quantile regression 
to estimate the UK-US 
returns gap at different 
percentiles of the returns 
distribution. Similar results 
arise regardless of whether 
only vintage year or also an 
extended set of controls are 
included in the regression.
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The last section shows that, while there are 
large differences in the average VC returns 
between the UK and the US, investors can find 
good performing funds in both countries. The 
question is how to identify them. Thus in this 
section we go beyond examining cross-country 
differences in returns and aim to explore which 
factors can help predict VC returns once cross-
country differences have been accounted for. 
We consider several potential drivers of returns 
and use a regression model to examine how 
their role varies across countries and over time. 
Specifically, we investigate the importance of 
the following variables: the size of the fund; 
the experience of the fund manager; the 
fund’s industry specialisation; its propensity to 
syndicate; its past performance; its location in 
an investor hub; some other characteristics of 
its investment strategy; and finally, the fund 
manager’s structure (i.e., its number of partners 
and offices). 
We estimate the effect that each of these 
variables has on the two measures of fund 
performance (net IRR and multiples), 
controlling in all regressions for the nationality 
of the fund manager, the funds’ vintage year 
and its industry and stage focus. We identify 
a few of these variables which are associated 
with better performance, whether considered 
separately or simultaneously with other factors: 
size, experience, past performance, hubs and 
earlier rounds. However, we find differences 
on their impact over time, with some of them 
having become weaker predictors in recent 
years.68 We next discuss the main findings 
in detail, and present the full results of the 
regression analysis in the appendix.69
 
4.1 Small funds underperform medium-
sized funds, but larger is not always 
better
The average IRR for the bottom quartile 
of funds by size (those with assets under 
management below $84 million) are about 7 
percentage points lower than those achieved 
by larger funds.70 Economies of scale in VC 
investing are, however, limited. Above this 
threshold, increasing the size of the fund 
is not associated with better performance, 
and in some circumstances it can even be 
counterproductive. 
A larger scale allows funds to cast a wider net, 
follow-up their most successful investments 
and spread the costs more widely. But the 
size of the fund is positively related to 
the experience of the fund manager itself. 
Successful fund managers are able to raise 
larger funds, so it could be experience and 
not size that is driving returns. In order to 
test this, we control for the experience of the 
fund manager and we find that medium-sized 
funds ($84-$365 million)71 continue to have a 
superior performance in comparison to small 
funds. However, we also find that larger funds 
(those above $365 million, the top quartile) 
no longer achieve better returns than small 
funds.72 Beyond a certain size diseconomies of 
scale arise, damaging performance. Therefore, 
while experienced fund managers may be able 
to raise very large funds, the analysis suggests 
that their fund returns would have been higher 
on average if they had kept their funds smaller. 
Or, in other words, it is medium-sized funds 
that perform better.73 
 
Part 4: Identifying the best-performing funds 
68. Note that some of the funds 
raised in the latest period 
(2002-05) have not yet 
exited their investments and 
returned the capital to their 
investors. This implies that 
fund returns data for the 
latest period is more likely 
to be unavailable or based 
on preliminary estimates 
of company valuations. 
Therefore, the weakening 
of some of the effects in 
the later period may be in 
part the result of using more 
noisy data, and not just of 
a shift in the market (this 
is the reason why funds 
raised after 2005 have 
been excluded from the 
performance analysis, since 
this issue would become 
more severe). 
69. Table A5 examines the effect 
of these different variables 
on fund performance, while 
Table A8 and A9 explore 
how the effect of the most 
significant ones (experience, 
round of investment, 
persistence and location in a 
hub) changes over time and 
across countries. 
70. See Table A5 columns 
4-6. Note that all fund 
size measures discussed 
throughout the report are 
in 2010 US dollars, and thus 
adjusted for inflation.
71. This corresponds to the 
second and third quartile of 
funds by size.
72. Excluding sectorial 
specialisation from the 
regression does not change 
the results.
73. This is consistent with 
Lerner, J., Leamon, A. 
and Hardymon, F. (2011) 
‘Private Equity, Venture 
Capital, and the Financing of 
Entrepreneurship: The Power 
of Active Investing.’ New 
York: Wiley.
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4.2 More experienced fund managers 
achieved higher returns
There are several reasons why more 
experienced venture capitalists could be able 
to deliver better returns. First, experience in 
screening potential deals helps fund managers 
select better companies to invest. Second, 
venture capitalists with more experience may 
be able to add more value to the firms they 
fund, for instance due to improved monitoring 
skills or by helping new ventures set business 
strategy and attract critical resources.74,75 
Finally, more experienced fund managers also 
have stronger and wider networks. These can 
be a source of comparative advantage when 
sourcing deals and looking for co-investors, 
but also when working with clients and 
suppliers or when engaging with potential 
acquirers or underwriters at the time to exit 
an investment. In fact, a large proportion of 
the benefits accrued from greater experience 
can be explained by the better networks more 
experience fund managers have access to.76 
We examine the importance of experience and 
find that more experienced fund managers 
deliver higher returns to their investors.77,78 We 
measure the experience of a fund manager by 
the number of prior investments it has made 
relative to the average for all the other funds 
with the same vintage year.79 However, using 
other measures of experience, such as the 
number of previous funds raised by that fund 
manager (sequence number) or the number 
of years it has been investing also leads to 
the same conclusion.80 Similarly, experience 
predicts returns regardless of the controls that 
we include in the regression.81 
We also test whether experience is equally 
important for both US and UK funds, and find 
this to be case.82 However, when we break 
down the effect of experience by period,83 we 
find that the benefits of experience appear 
to have faded over time, perhaps reflecting 
the fact that information on potential deals 
is becoming easier to access. Alternatively, 
this could potentially reflect the greater 
importance of experience in booming periods 
when opportunities abound, relative to more 
normal times when the differences between the 
best and the worst performing funds are much 
smaller. 
4.3 Past performance predicts future 
performance
We capture the performance of the preceding 
fund raised by each fund manager and find 
strong evidence of persistence in returns over 
time.84 A fund raised by a fund manager whose 
previous fund performed well is more likely to 
exhibit superior performance too.85,86 This sets 
venture capital apart from some other asset 
classes, such as mutual funds, where often the 
returns are more the result of luck than skill, 
and so display very limited persistence.87 
When comparing the persistence of returns 
in the UK and US, we find a significant 
relationship between past and present returns 
in the US, but not for the UK. This however 
could be driven by the relatively small number 
of UK fund managers for which we have 
performance data for multiple funds. Finally, 
we observe a varying degree of persistence 
across different periods. It was highest during 
the earliest period (1990-93) and lowest for 
funds raised during the dotcom bubble (1998-
2001), although it increased again in the latest 
period.88 
4.4 Funds in investor hubs had better 
returns
Fund managers located in one of the four 
largest investor hubs (Silicon Valley, New 
York, Massachusetts and London)  achieved 
on average 7.4 percentage points higher 
IRRs than those based elsewhere.89 This may 
be explained by the fact that these regions 
concentrate a large share of the world’s 
venture capital activity, so funds can benefit 
from agglomeration economies, both directly 
(since proximity to portfolio companies and 
other investors helps minimising information 
asymmetries) and indirectly (since portfolio 
companies can have access to better 
networks and a more developed supporting 
infrastructure among others).90 
However, performance varies across hubs and 
over time. Figure 11 displays the average 
IRR for funds based in each region relative 
to the average IRR achieved by US funds 
located outside the major hubs mentioned.91 
Funds in Silicon Valley or Massachusetts have 
significantly outperformed all other US funds. 
Instead, London’s performance has lagged 
behind that of all US hubs, on par with US 
funds outside hubs, but still better than for UK 
funds outside London. 
74. For instance, Gompers et al. 
(2005) provide evidence that 
prior deal flow experience 
helps venture capital 
managers to take advantage 
of deal opportunities by 
ramping-up investments 
when opportunities 
improve, and that ramp-up 
often leads to better exit 
performance (see Gompers, 
P., Kovner, A., Lerner, J. 
and Scharfstein, D. (2005) 
‘Venture Capital investment 
cycles: the role of experience 
and specialization,’ NBER 
Working Paper. Cambridge, 
MA: NBER.
75. Gompers, P., Lerner, 
J., Scharfstein, D. and 
Kovner, A. (2010) 
Performance Persistence 
in Entrepreneurship and 
Venture Capital. ‘Journal of 
Financial Economics.’ 96 (1), 
pp.18-32.
76. Hochberg, Y., Ljungqvist, 
A. and Lu, Y. (2007) Whom 
you know matters: venture 
capital networks and 
investment performance. 
‘Journal of Finance.’ 62, 
pp.251-301.
77. See Table A5 column 4-7.
78. Note that throughout the 
report ‘fund manager’ is 
used to refer to the venture 
capital firm that manages 
the fund, also known as the 
GP or general partner. 
79. Specifically, following 
Gompers et al. (2008) 
relative experience 
corresponds to the log of 
the number of investments 
made by the venture capital 
firm prior to the year the 
fund was raised and the 
average of the number of 
investments made prior to 
that year by all other venture 
capital firms raising funds 
in that year. Note that the 
negative value for average 
relative experience reported 
in the summary statistics 
tables is the result of the 
logarithmic transformation 
used when constructing 
the variable. See Gompers 
P., Kovner A., Lerner J., 
and Scharfstein, D. (2008)  
Venture Capital Investment 
Cycles: The Impact of 
Public Markets. ‘Journal of 
Financial Economics.’ 87 
(2008) 1–23.
80. Unreported regressions.
81. See Table A5 columns 7-11.
82. See Table A8 column 1.
83. See Table A8 column 2.
84. Note that information on 
past returns is only available 
for 259 funds.
85. See Table A5 column 11.
86. See Kaplan, S.N. and Schoar, 
A. (2005) Private Equity 
Performance: Returns, 
Persistence and Capital 
Flows. ‘Journal of Finance.’ 
60, pp.1791-1823.
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The superior performance of funds based in 
hubs has faded over time though. It was mostly 
driven by funds raised in 1994-1997, which 
were able to benefit from the dotcom bubble, 
but it has almost disappeared since then. The 
falling trend is common for all hubs except New 
York, which on the contrary has seen improving 
relative performance for funds based there 
over the last two decades. In 1990-93 New 
York underperformed the rest of the US while 
in 2002-05 it outperformed the rest of the US, 
including all the other hubs. In contrast, in the 
most recent period the advantage from being 
located in Silicon Valley, Massachusetts and 
London is no longer significant.
4.5 Investing in earlier rounds leads to 
better performance
Fund managers face several strategic choices 
that may impact fund performance, such as the 
number of companies to fund, the round at 
which to invest, the amount of initial funding 
to commit or whether to syndicate with other 
venture capitalists. We find that only one of 
these choices is significantly correlated with 
performance: funds investing in earlier rounds, 
admittedly a more risky strategy, performed 
better than those investing in later rounds.92,93 
This is true both in the UK and the US. This 
relationship is also quite robust over time 
(albeit weaker in the earliest period). On 
average, making the first investments one 
round earlier is associated with 2.4 percentage 
points higher returns.94
Which industries to target is an important 
investment strategy decision too. Funds can 
follow a narrow strategy, concentrating on 
a few sectors, or a wide strategy, spreading 
their investments across many sectors. We 
test the impact of specialisation with an 
index that measures how concentrated the 
funds’ portfolio is on a few sectors,95 but we 
do not find a robust relationship between 
specialisation and fund performance.96 This 
is not to say that all sectors perform equally. 
There are large differences in the historical 
returns generated by different sectors. 
Specifically, funds with a larger share invested 
in internet and computers, communications and 
electronics, and biotechnology and healthcare 
delivered the highest returns over the study 
period.97 But the extent to which concentration 
of the portfolio matters seems ambiguous.
Figure 11: Performance of funds based in investor hubs (relative to US funds outside hubs, 
1990-2005)
Controlling for Fund Vintage Year, Size and Stage Focus
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87. See for instance Cahart, M. 
M. (1997) On Persistence in 
Mutual Fund Performance. 
‘The Journal of Finance.’ 
52, 57-82; or Berk, J. 
and Green, R. (2002) 
‘Mutual Fund Flows and 
Performance in Rational 
Markets.’, WorkingPaper No. 
9275, National Bureau of 
Economic Research.
88. The coefficient for previous 
returns falls however short 
from significance for the 
latest period (2002-05), 
even if its magnitude is not 
far from that for funds raised 
in the period just before the 
bubble (1994-97). See table 
A8 column 6.
89. See Table A5 column 9.
90. Hochberg, Y., Ljungqvist, 
A. and Lu, Y. (2007) Whom 
you know matters: venture 
capital networks and 
investment performance. 
‘Journal of Finance.’ 62, 
pp.251-301.
91. This corresponds to the 
coefficients in Table A9 
column 2.
92. We find this result regardless 
of whether stage focus 
dummies are included or not 
in the regression. Note that 
this is not to say that ‘early-
stage’ funds outperform 
‘later-stage’ funds, but 
simply that getting into the 
venture at an earlier round 
pays off. 
93. The coefficients for the 
other three variables 
(number of companies 
invested by the fund, 
average size of investment 
at first investment and 
average number of 
co-investors) are not 
statistically different from 
zero, although in some 
unreported regressions we 
find that syndicating with 
more partners is weakly 
associated with better 
performance. 
94. Table A5 column 8.
95. See footnote 42 in Section 
2 for further discussion 
on the Herfindahl index 
used to measure industry 
specialisation.
96. In unreported regressions, 
we find some evidence 
on industry specialisation 
being associated with better 
performance for US based 
funds in the earlier periods, 
but not in more recent 
periods or in the UK.
97. Industry controls in the 
regressions, which measure 
the share of the fund 
invested in a sector, provide 
an estimate of the returns 
generated by each sector 
relative to the returns 
generated by financial 
services. The coefficients 
for each industry are: 
Internet and computers 
39.28; communications and 
electronics 34.51; business/
industrial 23.59; consumer 
20.06; energy 23.07; 
biotech/healthcare 30.48; 
business services 33.18; 
other industries 39.76. 
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4.6 A larger number of partners was 
associated with higher returns
We also investigate the relationship between 
performance and the number of partners and 
offices that the fund has. Venture capital 
organisations have on average five general 
partners and two offices, but there is a wide 
variation among them.98 Most venture capital 
general partners have a decade or more of 
experience.99 However, any given partner can 
only monitor a certain number of deals and 
effectively serve on only a limited number of 
boards, so a larger number of partners may be 
an advantage. 
We find that funds with more partners 
outperform, even after controlling for fund size 
and experience among others.100 However, the 
positive effect associated with a higher number 
of partners has been eroded over time. A larger 
number of offices are also correlated with 
better performance, but very weakly and only 
in the earliest period.101 Altogether, it appears 
that having more resources, whether partners 
or offices, may help the fund manager take 
advantage of more opportunities during boom 
periods (as prior to the dotcom bust), but it 
does not make a difference in non-boom times.
4.7 Much of the variability in returns is 
not explained by these factors
A note of caution to conclude this section, the 
model that we have estimated is successful 
at identifying several factors that help to 
explain performance. But differences across 
funds regarding these factors can only 
account for about 30-40 per cent of the 
variation in returns.102 In other words, much 
of the variability of returns continues to be 
unexplained. This is most likely accounted 
for by a combination of unmeasured (or 
unmeasurable) factors and serendipity. After 
all, investing in new ventures is, and will 
continue to be, an uncertain business. 
98. See Table A3. Both the 
number of partners and 
offices range from 1 to c. 
20. UK and US funds have 
the same number of partners 
on average. However, the 
data on partners and offices 
for the UK is extremely 
limited and self-selected, 
so the results for the UK 
need to be interpreted with 
great care. The data for the 
US has wider coverage, but 
the overall sample for the 
partners (offices) analysis 
is still reduced to 520 (426) 
funds.
99. Gompers, P. (1998) Venture 
capital growing pains: 
Should the market diet? 
‘Journal of Banking and 
Finance.’ 22, pp.1089-1104.
100. See Table A10 columns 
1-2. 
101. See Table A10 column 7-8.
102. If persistence is included, 
the sample becomes 
smaller and the R-squared 
get close to 0.6.
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Governments around the world have taken a 
strong interest in facilitating access to finance 
for innovative high-growth companies, and the 
UK has been no exception. Several schemes in 
support of the venture capital industry have 
been set up in response to the belief that 
there are significant funding gaps not being 
addressed by the market, particularly for small 
high-technology start-ups or in particular 
regions.103 The attempts to stimulate the 
supply of new sources of finance have followed 
different approaches, from ensuring that each 
region has access to regional-based VC funds 
to trying to demonstrate that investors in early-
stage funds can make robust returns, thereby 
promoting the private sector venture capital 
industry.104 Many past UK interventions have 
fallen foul of a few common problems: trying 
to achieve too many goals; being sub-scale; 
limiting the pool of potential investments; and 
having unrealistic time horizons.105 However, 
recent government schemes (i.e. ECFs) have 
avoided many of these pitfalls and are aiming 
to make use of the best of private sector 
experience and establish a credible policy in the 
area.
Despite their growing importance in the 
market,106 the evidence on the performance 
of UK government VC schemes is limited. 
A recent evaluation by the National Audit 
Office (NAO)107 concluded that the financial 
performance of public funds had been very 
poor (although not untypical when compared 
with private VC returns over the same period), 
and pointed to poor design and geographical 
restrictions on the funds’ investment activity 
as factors to address. But while the financial 
performance of the UK public funds has 
not been good, their impact on supply of 
finance may have been significant, since many 
recipients of public funding claimed that in the 
absence of the schemes they would have not 
undertaken their investments.108 International 
studies also provide a mixed picture. For 
instance, a recent report by the World 
Economic Forum found that companies with 
moderate government VC support outperform 
(in terms of value and patent creation) both 
companies with only private venture capital 
support and those with extensive public 
support. This effect was however stronger for 
programs associated with national governments 
(and international organisations) rather than 
sub-national entities (e.g. state and provincial 
governments).109 
5.1 Publicly backed funds have delivered 
lower returns than private funds, but the 
gap has narrowed 
In this section, we assess the financial 
performance of publicly backed venture 
capital funds.110 Public schemes are generally 
set up to support investment in the least 
profitable segments of the market, where 
private VC investors will not go. In addition, 
they are often motivated by spillover effects 
and other non-commercially driven outputs. 
Therefore, the financial returns generated 
by publicly supported funds are a useful but 
incomplete metric to assess the success of 
these interventions. Also, when evaluating 
their returns, they need to be benchmarked 
with private funds operating in the same 
space, since otherwise there is the risk of 
underestimating their performance.
We analyse performance records of 93 (50 
UK and 43 US) publicly backed funds111 
raised between 1990 and 2005, which have 
made over 3,100 investments. Our coverage 
Part 5: Public interventions to support VC funds 103. See Sunley, O., Klagge, 
B., Berndt, C. and Martin, 
R. (2005) Venture capital 
programmes in the UK 
and Germany: in what 
sense regional policies? 
‘Regional Studies.’ 39 
(2), pp.255-273; also 
Mason, .C and Harrison, 
R. (2003b) Closing the 
Regional Equity Gap? A 
Critique of the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s 
Regional Venture Capital 
Funds Initiative. ‘Regional 
Studies.’ Vol.37, 8, pp.855-
868.
104. Ibid.
105. NESTA (2009) ‘Reshaping 
the UK Economy.’ London: 
NESTA.
106. Publicly backed UK VC 
funds have become 
increasingly important 
over the past decade: 
they participated in 42 per 
cent of all venture capital 
deals in 2009. Since 2005, 
there has been a broadly 
stable representation of 
the public sector in the 
venture capital market, 
after a significant increase 
in the portion of deals 
that are publicly backed 
following the dotcom 
crash. In 2002, over 20 per 
cent of all deals involved 
a publicly backed fund,  
and this share doubled to 
over 40 per cent by 2009. 
This has been driven both 
by falls in private sector 
funding and increases in 
government funding (see: 
(2008) ‘Shifting Sands: 
The changing nature of 
the early-stage venture 
capital market in the UK.’ 
London:NESTA).
107. National Audit Office 
(2009) ‘Venture capital 
support to small 
businesses.’ London: NAO.
108. The authors of the report 
also surveyed business 
groups, businesses and 
fund managers that were 
involved in the schemes. 
Thirty-two per cent of 
businesses reported they 
would have been unable 
to obtain any finance 
without support from the 
funds. Around 23 per cent 
reported that they would 
not have gone ahead with 
their planned activity in 
the absence of finance 
from the Department’s 
funds.
109. Brander J., Du, Q. and 
Hellmann, T. (2010) ‘The 
Effects of Government-
Sponsored Venture Capital: 
International Evidence.’ 
NBER Working Paper No. 
16521. Cambridge, MA: 
NBER.
110. In this section we use 
the term public funds as 
a short hand for publicly 
backed funds, and so 
it includes funds set up 
directly by the public 
sector and private funds 
that have benefited 
from different forms of 
government support (tax 
credits, subsidies, co-
funding, etc.).
of public funds is limited, but we do have 
access to very detailed information about 
their investment activities, and thus we can 
compare their performance with that of solely 
private funds with the same characteristics. 
This is particularly useful because the 
average public and private fund are different 
in several dimensions. As reported in Table 
A4 in the appendix, public funds tend to be 
smaller, undertake fewer investments in fewer 
companies, and invest smaller amounts. They 
also have fewer exits and achieve markedly 
lower returns, about 10 percentage points 
lower IRR than the average private fund in the 
UK and 6 percentage points lower in the US.112 
We next use the same regression approach as 
in previous sections to examine what factors 
may account for this public-private gap, as 
well as to estimate the real magnitude of the 
gap when like-for-like funds with the same 
characteristics are compared. Table A11 reports 
the full results of this analysis, summarised in 
Figure 12. 
In line with previous studies we find 
that publicly backed funds historically 
underperformed private funds, particularly in 
the UK.113 However, the public-private returns 
gap shrinks when we control for vintage year,114 
which indicates that many public funds were 
established in years preceding poor market 
performance. Still, large differences in returns 
remain for some periods even after we control 
for vintage year.
Publicly backed funds in the pre-bottom bubble 
period heavily underperformed private funds, 
with average returns for public funds being up 
to 20 percentage points lower in the UK. The 
results suggest that in later years governments 
have become savvier when designing new 
schemes.115 Based on the regression analysis, 
there may still be some margin for improvement 
as in the latest period there continues to be a 
gap in the returns between public and private 
funds, even if it is small and only statistically 
significant for the US. 
5.2 The public-private gap in returns is 
not fully explained by observed fund 
characteristics
Observers have often pointed to the small 
size of many public funds as a culprit for their 
underperformance. But it is not just fund 
size that explains the difference in returns. 
In the earliest period the public-private gap 
decreases slightly after we control for size, 
but it continues to be large and significant.116 
Controlling for stage, another factor commonly 
cited given publicly backed funds’ usual focus 
on early-stage, does not alter the results 
either. Similarly, not much changes when we 
add industry controls.117 It is not the industries 
that public funds choose to target, but their 
selection of companies within industries 
(and what they do with them) that leads to 
underperformance. Adding additional controls, 
such as experience of the fund manager, 
industry specialisation and other measures 
of investment strategy reduces the historical 
public-private gap for the US, but not for the 
UK.118 
Many publicly backed funds had a regional 
focus that may have prevented them from 
locating in hubs and taking advantage of the 
benefits associated with them, but controlling 
for investor hubs does not eliminate the gap. 
Controlling for the proportion of companies 
that a given fund successfully exits also does 
not explain the public underperformance. 
If the historical public-private returns gap 
is not accounted for by these factors, what 
does explain it? One hypothesis is that the 
restrictions that publicly backed schemes 
impose on fund managers may hinder their 
performance. An alternative hypothesis is 
that governments may fund less capable fund 
managers, either because they are unable to 
distinguish good from bad fund managers 
or, alternatively, because only managers 
that cannot raise funding in the market 
seek support from government schemes.119 
Whatever the answer, the narrowing of the 
public-private performance gap in most recent 
years suggests that this may have become less 
of an issue. 
A question that remains is what has been 
the role of public funds in explaining the 
historical UK-US returns gap. While the US 
has more government schemes to encourage 
VC than many realise, the UK has been 
particularly active in using public funding to 
support the VC industry. The design of the 
schemes has also been different. We find that 
the underperformance of publicly backed 
government funds is one of the factors 
that contribute to the aggregate UK-US 
returns gap.120 However, the US continues to 
experience higher historical returns than the 
UK when we exclude public funds from the 
sample.
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111. This includes 50 UK-based 
funds that received 
support under the 
government schemes 
(RVCFs, UCFs and VCTs) or 
the EIF and 43 US-based 
funds that made use of 
the SBIC programme. 
VCTs are codified as 
publicly backed funds due 
to the tax benefits they 
receive and the strings 
that come attached with 
them, but public funds 
continue to underperform 
private funds if VCTs are 
excluded (although in that 
case we do not observe 
convergence in public-
private returns in the UK). 
We are able to identify 
publicly supported funds 
in our UK sample with high 
reliability. Instead, in the 
US we only codify as public 
funds those participating 
in one programme (SBIC), 
and so many other publicly 
supported funds in the 
US for which we do not 
have data (e.g., state 
government programmes 
etc.) are likely to be coded 
as private funds.
112. Note that some publicly 
backed funds in the 
US may be coded as 
private (see note above), 
so this difference may 
underestimate the gap 
between public and private 
funds in the US.
113. See Table A11 column 1.
114. See Table A11 column 2.
115. See Table A11 column 3.
116. See Table A11 column 4.
117. Specifically, a small change 
in standard errors and 
coefficients for the US 
makes the estimates of 
the public-private gap to 
fall short from significance 
when before they were 
weakly significant. 
118. Measures of investment 
strategy refer to the 
number of companies 
the fund invests in, the 
average amount invested 
by the fund in their first 
investment into a company, 
the average round of the 
first investment into a 
company and the average 
number of syndication 
partners involved in the 
deals they participated in. 
See Table A11 column 8.
119. We explored this question 
looking at the performance 
of the private funds of 
those fund managers 
that had also received 
public backing at some 
point, but did not find any 
conclusive evidence to 
discriminate between the 
two hypotheses.
120. See Table A11 (compared 
with Table A5).
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Figure 12: Public-private returns gap by country (public returns gap relative to private funds)121 
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This report examines the performance 
differences between UK and US venture 
capital funds. UK funds have historically 
underperformed US funds but this gap has 
narrowed to one percentage point (net IRR) 
for funds raised in the post bubble period. 
The historical performance gap is robust to 
different measures of venture capital activity, 
fund characteristics or investments strategies, 
suggesting that the UK environment was a 
major contributor to this gap.
The evidence shows the progress that the UK 
has made over the last two decades, but it also 
highlights the important challenges that lie 
ahead. Whether the UK venture capital industry 
will be able to match (or, why not, surpass) the 
performance of the US venture capital industry 
in the next decade will depend on the decisions 
taken by investors, fund managers and 
policymakers among others. The findings in 
this report can help inform investors’ and fund 
managers’ decisions, but they have particularly 
important implications for UK policymakers: 
•	Remember venture capital activity does not 
exist in a vacuum. Venture capitalists are 
tremendously dependent on their partners. 
Without entrepreneurs who conceptualise 
visionary businesses, experienced lawyers 
able to negotiate agreements, skilled 
marketing gurus and engineers, and 
customers who are willing to take a chance 
on a young firm, success is unlikely. The 
evidence shows that the environment that 
UK start-ups faced was a major contributor 
to the UK historical gap in VC returns. While 
there are encouraging signs that the UK is 
becoming a better place for entrepreneurial 
ventures, this cannot be taken for granted. 
Efforts to improve the conditions faced by 
those young innovative companies that could 
become the giants of tomorrow should be 
stepped up. 
•	Resist the temptation to overengineer 
public support schemes. In many instances, 
government requirements that limit the 
flexibility of entrepreneurs and venture 
investors have been detrimental. It is 
tempting to add restrictions on several 
dimensions: for instance, the locations in 
which the firms can operate, the type of 
securities venture investors can use, and the 
evolution of the firms (e.g. restrictions on 
acquisitions or secondary sales of stock). 
These types of restrictions have been present 
in a number of past UK public programs, 
and probably can help explain their large 
historical underperformance. More recent 
programs appear to have mostly overcome 
the temptation to micromanage the 
entrepreneurial and venture capital process, 
but pressures to do so in the future should 
be resisted. 
•	Avoid initiatives that are too small. 
Policymakers must be sure that their 
venture initiatives have critical mass. Too 
small a program will do little to improve the 
environment for pioneering entrepreneurs 
and venture funds. It is also likely to lead 
to poor financial returns (i.e. small funds 
tend to underperform), which may create 
a backlash that impedes future efforts. Too 
often, UK efforts have led to the creation of 
undercapitalised funds which do not have 
the staying power to back their companies 
through development. 
Over the coming months NESTA will continue 
its work to develop further evidence on what 
measures policy makers can take to improve the 
environment for UK high-growth companies.
Part 6: Policy implications 
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Appendix 1: Data sources and definitions 
 
Variable
Fund size
 
 
 
Size quartiles 
 
 
Number of investments 
made by the fund
Number of companies 
invested in by the fund
Number of rounds per 
company
Share of companies 
receiving multiple 
investments
First investment round 
number
Average size of 
investment per round
Average size of 
investment at first 
investment
Average size of 
investment per 
company
Net IRR 
 
 
 
Multiples 
 
 
 
Share of IPO exits 
 
Share of M&A exits 
 
Average number of 
syndication partners
Details
The inflation-adjusted size of the fund in 2010 USD (millions).
 
 
 
The size quartiles are dummy variables equal to one if the size 
of the fund lies within a given quartile in the distribution. The 
smallest quartile is omitted as a reference in the regression and 
the others are interpreted relative to this one.
The number of investments made by the fund during its 
lifetime.
The number of companies receiving investment from the fund. 
The average number of investments made by a fund into its 
portfolio companies.
The number of portfolio companies of a fund that receive more 
than one investment as a proportion of all portfolio companies. 
The average round at which a fund makes its first investment 
into a portfolio company.
The average amount invested by the fund in the portfolio 
company on a given round in 2010 USD (millions).
The average amount invested by the fund in their first 
investment into a portfolio company in 2010 USD (millions). 
The average amount invested in each portfolio company. 
in 2010 USD (millions). 
The net IRR earned by an LP to date after fees and carry. The 
internal rate of return is based upon the realized cash flows and 
the valuation of the remaining interest in the partnership. IRR 
is an estimated figure, given that it relies upon not only cash 
flows but also the valuation of unrealized assets.
The ratio between the total value that the LP has derived from 
its cash and securities plus the value of the LP’s remaining 
interest in the partnership – and its total cash interest in the 
partnership – i.e. distributed investment in the partnership, 
expressed as a multiple.
The number of companies that received investment from 
a given fund and exited through an IPO as a fraction of all 
companies receiving investment from the fund.
The number of companies that received investment from a 
given fund and exited through a merger of acquisition as a 
fraction of all companies receiving investment from the fund.
The average number of funds that invest in a deal that the fund 
is involved in.
*Additional Info
See data notes
 
 
 
See data notes
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional Net IRR 
data is derived from 
imputation primarily 
based on the Multiple 
value the fund reported
Additional Net IRR 
data is derived from 
imputation primarily 
based on the Net IRR 
value the fund reported
 
 
 
 
 
Source
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson, 
Preqin and desk 
research*
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson, 
Preqin and desk 
research*
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
Preqin* 
 
 
 
Preqin* 
 
 
 
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
Thomson 
Table A1: Data sources and definitions
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Variable
Experience of GP 
relative to the market at 
fund vintage 
Sequence number of 
the fund
Industry specialisation 
index 
Hub Dummy 
Year FE 
Number of partners of 
GP at fund vintage year
Number of offices of 
GP at fund vintage year
Proportion of capital 
invested into each 
region
Stage Controls 
 
Proportion of capital 
invested into each 
industry
UK-Based Fund
Details
The difference between the log of the number of investments 
made by a fund manager prior to the fund vintage year and the 
average of the number of investments made by all organisations 
prior to that year. 
The sequence number of a fund within the fund manager. 
Index created by calculating the sum of the squared proportions 
of the number of investments made by a fund into each of the 
nine industry groupings.
Dummy variable equal to one if the fund is located in a hub 
(Silicon Valley, New York, Massachusetts, London).
Dummy variable equal to one if the fund’s vintage year was the 
year in question.
The number of partners reported by the GP in the year the fund 
was raised (or the previous or subsequent year).
The number of offices reported by the GP in the year the fund 
was raised (or the previous or subsequent year).
The proportion of capital invested by the fund that went to 
companies located in a given region. 
Dummy variables equal to 1 if the fund’s investment focus is in 
the particular stage. 
The proportion of capital invested by the fund that went to 
companies operating in a given industry. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund’s GP is located in the UK.
*Additional Info
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See data notes
 
 
 
 
 
See data notes
 
 
 
 
Preqin for the fund’s 
reporting performance 
data, Thomson for the 
others
Source
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
 
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data
Thomson, Preqin 
and desk research*
EVCA, VCR, Pratt’s 
guide and Galante.
EVCA, VCR, Pratt’s 
guide and Galante.
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
Preqin, Thomson, 
EVCA and desk 
research*
NESTA calculation 
using Thomson data 
Preqin and 
Thomson*
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Fund characteristics: Preqin provides 
information on fund characteristics such as 
fund size, type, location and focus. In order 
to provide more accurate information on 
fund characteristics (including management 
characteristics) we captured individual 
investment deals made by each fund. We 
used three different databases to do so. 
Thomson One Reuters was our primary 
source of individual investment deals data. 
Thomson One captures investments deals 
for over 14,000 US, UK or European private 
equity funds. Investments deals for the 
funds we have performance records for were 
captured using the Thomson One database. 
This was supplemented with data acquired 
from VentureSource Dow Jones (when funds 
were not included in Thomson One database). 
These two databases (fund returns and fund 
individual investment outcomes) were merged 
and any discrepancies between the two were 
reconciled. These related to a minority of cases 
where the sources reported a different vintage 
year, size or stage focus for a fund. To find 
the true values we consulted other sources or 
contacted the fund managers themselves.
Fund type: Our study sample contains funds 
that are classified by Preqin as seed-stage, 
early-stage, early-stage: seed, early-stage: 
start-up, venture (general), expansion, 
development, later-stage, balanced and 
mezzanine.122 We aggregate these into five 
new categories: i) ‘early-stage’ which includes 
all seed-stage, early-stage, early-stage: seed 
and early-stage: start-up funds; ii) ‘generalist’ 
which includes all venture (general); iii) 
‘expansion’ which includes all expansion, 
development and later-stage funds; iv) 
‘balanced’ funds; and v) ‘mezzanine’ funds. 
Again with this variable, some discrepancies 
appeared between what our two main sources 
were reporting. We again endeavoured to 
attain more information on what the correct 
stage focus for each fund is by checking other 
external sources such as industry experts, 
as well as contacting the funds themselves 
through phone calls or emails. Using the 
combination of the information received from 
these sources and our knowledge of what 
investments the fund made, we are confident 
we have a variable that accurately reflects the 
investment focus of the funds in the sample. 
Fund size and vintage year: Two main sources 
were used to locate data on the size of 
(amount of capital raised by) the VC funds. 
These sources were Thomson Reuters and 
Preqin. Discrepancies occasionally appeared 
between the sizes reported by the two sources 
so the following actions were taken to reconcile 
the figures.
•	If the difference between the fund sizes was 
less than 5 per cent of the larger estimate, 
using the home currency the amount was 
reported in from Preqin, we use the value in 
US dollars from Thomson.
•	If the difference between the fund sizes 
was greater than 5 per cent using the same 
criteria, we search for a third source, e.g. 
VentureSource, fund website, to confirm 
the value given by one of the main sources. 
The criteria for confirming a fund size using 
a third source is, again, a difference of less 
than 5 per cent of the larger estimate in the 
reported currency. 
•	On the rare occasion where two or more 
sources confirm a size not within 5 per cent 
of the size reported in Thomson or Preqin, 
this confirmed size is used.
•	Where the size in the reported currency 
being used comes from a source other than 
Thomson, the Thomson exchange rate 
corresponding to that fund is used to convert 
the size into US dollars. This is only necessary 
when the reported currency isn’t already 
US dollars and is due to the investment 
sizes corresponding to these funds coming 
from Thomson and using the same rates. If 
the Thomson exchange rate for the fund is 
unavailable, the Preqin rate is used. 
•	In instances where the fund size is reported 
by only one of Preqin and Thomson, this size 
is used.
•	All amounts are converted to 2010 US dollars 
(and so they are adjusted for inflation).
•	Funds with assets under management less 
than $1 million have been excluded from the 
analysis (due to inconsistencies in the data).
Similarly discrepancies were found relating to 
the vintage years reported by the two main 
sources. These were reconciled as follows:
•	If a difference of only one year was found 
between the sources, the year from Thomson 
is used. If a difference of more than one year 
is found, a third source is found to confirm 
either of the vintage years reported by 
Thomson or Preqin.
Partners and office data: We use information 
from three directories: Pratt’s guide to Private 
122. Preqin defines investments 
stages as follows: 
•	Balanced. Private equity 
funds that invest in 
companies at all stages 
of development from 
early-stage to buy-out.
• Early Stage. Type of 
venture fund that invests 
only in the early stage of 
a company life. There are 
two main categories of 
early-stage funds: start-
up and seed investments
•	Expansion. (Also known 
as ‘development’ or 
‘growth capital’) Funds 
aiming to grow and 
expand an established 
company. For example: 
to finance increased 
production capacity, 
product development, 
marketing and to provide 
additional working 
capital.
•	Mezzanine. Mezzanine 
debts are debts that 
incorporate equity-
based options, such 
as warrants, with a 
lower-priority debt. 
Mezzanine is often used 
to finance acquisitions 
and buyouts. 
•	Venture (General). 
Venture capital is a 
type of private equity 
investment that 
provides capital to new 
or growing businesses. 
Venture funds invest 
in start-up firms and 
small businesses with 
perceived, long-term 
growth potential
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Equity and Venture Capital sources, Galante’s 
Venture Capital & Private Equity Directory and 
information from the Magdalen Centre at the 
Oxford Science Park, and from the European 
Venture Capital Association, in order to collect 
data on GP partners and offices. Our intention 
was to analyse the effect of partners/offices 
for the period in which the fund was active. The 
difficulty this presented was obtaining historic 
data on the number of partners and offices 
the GP had on the fund’s vintage year (since 
accessing not current data was not enough).
Performance data: The two most commonly 
used performance metrics are fund multiple, 
which measures the total distribution relative 
to the total takedown, and the internal rate 
of return (IRR), which takes into account the 
time value of money (McKenzie and Janeway 
2008,123 for a critique see Phalippou 2009124). 
The most commonly used source of VC fund 
performance data in the literature is Reuters 
Thomson One. The principal shortcomings of 
these two databases have been outlined by 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003):125 (i) the 
performance data is largely provided by VC 
firms on a voluntary basis and thus potentially 
subject to selection biases; and, (ii) the data 
is based on unrealised as well as realised 
investments, which introduces noise and 
potentially biases due to subjective accounting 
treatment. 
The multiple reports the return received by the 
fund’s LPs compared to the amount of capital 
they committed to the fund. A weakness of 
this measure is that it does not take account 
of the time value of money, i.e. it does not 
account for the length of time it took for the 
fund to deliver the return to the LPs. Net IRR 
overcomes this by using discounted cash flow 
data to take account of both the return the LP 
receives and how long it took to be realised 
therefore making it a more accurate measure. 
Net IRRs are reported net of fees and carried 
interest and include returns from dividends.
The analysis of performance records 
represented an empirical challenge. Several 
funds report either Net IRR or Multiples (but 
not both) and in order to conduct a meaningful 
analysis the missing value (Net IRR or Multiple) 
was imputed using a regression analysis with 
the reported value (Net IRR or Multiple) and 
controls for industry, country and vintage 
year. The resulting measures of returns are 
winsorized at the 1 per cent level to reduce the 
impact of outliers on the estimation.
The primary source of VC fund performance 
data was the Private Equity Intelligence 
database (Preqin). Preqin contains performance 
data for over 4,000 private equity funds based 
in the US, UK or continental Europe, from 
which over 1,000 are operating in the VC 
market. Their performance records are attained 
either directly from the LP and/or GP of the 
fund or calculated internally by Preqin based 
upon cash flows and valuations, provided for 
individual partnerships. We supplemented 
this with performance records from other 
commercial databases such as LP Source Dow 
Jones, EurekaHedge, Pitchbooks and desk 
research. 
LP Source is a newly established (by Dow 
Jones) research tool that provides data on 
active fund managers, their investments 
strategies and preferred industries. Although 
the dataset is mainly focused on the US 
market, a tailored dataset with performance 
data for UK funds was made available to the 
researchers. EurekaHedge provides information 
on the global alternative fund industry and 
contains over 20,000 funds across all assets 
class. Its European Private Equity Database 
provided us with a number of VC fund 
performance records that were not available in 
the other databases used.
Performance records for quoted funds (i.e. 
VCTs) were acquired by the Tax Shelter report 
published by the Allenbridge Group plc, an 
independent UK tax efficient investment 
consultancy.126 Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) 
are companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, and are similar to investment trusts. 
They are run by fund managers who are usually 
members of larger investment groups. They 
invest in a range of small higher-risk companies 
whose shares and securities are not listed on 
a recognised stock exchange, by investing 
through VCTs. However, companies whose 
shares etc. are dealt in solely on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock 
Exchange or on two of the Plus Markets are 
regarded as unquoted companies.127
123. McKenzie, M.,  Janeway, 
W. (2008)  ‘Venture Capital 
Fund Performance and 
the IPO Market.’ CFAP 
Working Paper No.30.
124. Phalippou, L. (2009), The 
Hazards of Using IRR to 
Measure Performance: The 
Case of Private Equity. 
‘CFA Digest.’ May 2009, 
Vol. 39, No. 2.
125. Ljungqvist, A., Richardson, 
M., and Wolfenzon, D, 
(2005) ‘The investment 
behaviour of private equity 
fund managers.’ Working 
paper, New York University.
126. Allenbridge Group 
plc, http://www.
taxshelterreport.co.uk/
vct_performance.htm, 
accessed on XX/06/2010
127. HM Revenue & Customs: 
http://www.hmrc.gov.
uk/guidance/vct.htm , 
accessed on 20/08/2010
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Figure A1: Venture capital returns over time by data source in the UK and the US
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Table A2: Summary	statistics	–	All	funds	(UK,	US	and	continental	Europe)
Note:	The	last	six	columns	report	whether	there	are	significant	statistical	differences	in	the	means	across	countries	(positive	or	negative).	+,++,+++	(-,--,---)	
indicate	significance	at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
          1990-2005               2006-2009                   1990-2005                  2006-2009  
                 UK                 US                CE                UK                US                CE               Test of means                              Test of means 
 n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean UK-US UK-CE CE-US UK-US UK-CE CE-U
Fund	size	 401	 142.2	 2835	 163.3	 825	 78.2	 138	 148.4	 1156	 171.1	 402	 93.4	 	 +++	 ---	 	 +++	 ---
Number	of	investments	made	by	the	fund	 401	 16.99	 2835	 31.87	 825	 14.8	 138	 8.66	 1156	 15.38	 402	 9.2	 ---	 	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
Number	of	companies	invested	in	by	the	fund	 401	 11.50	 2835	 15.88	 825	 10.48	 138	 5.94	 1156	 8.48	 402	 6.74	 ---	 	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
Average	number	of	rounds	per	company	 401	 1.28	 2835	 1.75	 825	 1.31	 138	 1.30	 1156	 1.60	 402	 1.25	 ---	 	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
Share	of	companies	receiving	multiple	investments	 401	 0.18	 2835	 0.38	 825	 0.22	 138	 0.21	 1156	 0.34	 402	 0.17	 ---	 ---	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
First	investment	round	number	 401	 1.70	 2835	 2.57	 825	 1.74	 138	 1.78	 1156	 2.61	 402	 2.03	 ---	 	 ---	 ---	 -	 ---
Average	size	of	investment	per	round	 401	 3.79	 2835	 2.98	 825	 2.22	 138	 4.93	 1156	 3.76	 402	 3.29	 ++	 +++	 ---	 	 +	
Average	size	of	investment	at	first	investment	 401	 3.91	 2835	 3.36	 825	 2.31	 138	 5.03	 1156	 4.00	 402	 3.35	 +	 +++	 ---	 	 +	
Average	size	of	investment	per	company	 401	 4.61	 2835	 4.71	 825	 2.86	 138	 5.93	 1156	 5.18	 402	 3.98	 	 +++	 ---	 	 ++	 --
Share	of	IPO	exits	 401	 0.10	 2835	 0.15	 825	 0.10	 138	 0.04	 1156	 0.05	 402	 0.05	 ---	 	 ---	 	 	
Share	of	M&A	exits	 401	 0.23	 2835	 0.35	 825	 0.18	 138	 0.07	 1156	 0.14	 402	 0.08	 ---	 +++	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
Average	number	of	syndication	partners	 119	 2.92	 672	 4.14	 98	 3.05	 17	 2.93	 158	 3.53	 36	 2.04	 ---	 	 ---	 	 +	 ---
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	 401	 -2.24	 2835	 -1.51	 825	 -2.62	 138	 -2.24	 1156	 -1.37	 402	 -1.97	 ---	 +++	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
Sequence	number	of	fund	 401	 3.07	 2835	 2.13	 825	 1.02	 138	 2.91	 1156	 3.08	 402	 2.66	 +++	 +++	 ---	 	 	 -
Industry	specialisation	index	 401	 0.47	 2835	 0.55	 825	 0.50	 138	 0.58	 1156	 0.65	 402	 0.56	 ---	 --	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
Hubs	(1	if	fund	located	in	a	hub)	 401	 0.68	 2835	 0.46	 825	 0.00	 138	 0.63	 1156	 0.48	 402	 0.00	 +++	 +++	 ---	 +++	 +++	 ---
Vintage	year	 401	 2000	 2835	 1999	 825	 2001	 138	 2007	 1156	 2008	 402	 2007	 +++	 ---	 +++	 	 	
Number	of	partners	of	GP	at	fund	vintage	 30	 4.93	 350	 5.13	 43	 4.51	 8	 4.25	 98	 5.61	 25	 4.76	 	 	 -	 -	 	
Number	of	offices	of	GP	at	fund	vintage	 11	 10.00	 415	 1.81	 9	 2.00	 8	 2.00	 139	 2.42	 11	 3.00	 +++	 +++	 	 	 -	
Proportion of capital invested into:                  
UK	companies	 401	 0.63	 2834	 0.01	 824	 0.04	 138	 0.60	 1156	 0.01	 402	 0.03	 +++	 +++	 +++	 +++	 +++	 +++
US	companies	 401	 0.16	 2834	 0.93	 824	 0.11	 138	 0.12	 1156	 0.91	 402	 0.09	 ---	 ++	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
CE	companies	 401	 0.14	 2834	 0.02	 824	 0.82	 138	 0.15	 1156	 0.02	 402	 0.84	 +++	 ---	 +++	 +++	 ---	 +++
Other	companies	 401	 0.08	 2834	 0.04	 824	 0.03	 138	 0.13	 1156	 0.06	 402	 0.04	 +++	 +++	 -	 ++	 +++	 --
Fund Stage focus:                  
Early-stage	 401	 0.43	 2835	 0.43	 825	 0.53	 138	 0.41	 1156	 0.52	 402	 0.53	 	 ---	 +++	 --	 --	
Expansion	 401	 0.15	 2835	 0.16	 825	 0.13	 138	 0.09	 1156	 0.10	 402	 0.11	 	 	 --	 	 	
Mezzanine	 401	 0.02	 2835	 0.05	 825	 0.02	 138	 0.05	 1156	 0.05	 402	 0.01	 ---	 	 ---	 	 +	 ---
Generalist	 401	 0.17	 2835	 0.14	 825	 0.09	 138	 0.09	 1156	 0.10	 402	 0.09	 	 +++	 ---	 	 	
Balanced	 401	 0.22	 2835	 0.22	 825	 0.22	 138	 0.36	 1156	 0.23	 402	 0.26	 	 	 	 +++	 ++	
Proportion of capital invested in:                  
Internet	and	computer	 401	 0.30	 2834	 0.41	 824	 0.34	 138	 0.27	 1156	 0.37	 402	 0.26	 ---	 -	 ---	 ---	 	 ---
Communications	and	electronics	 401	 0.16	 2834	 0.20	 824	 0.17	 138	 0.13	 1156	 0.16	 402	 0.16	 ---	 	 ---	 	 	
Business/Industrial	 401	 0.06	 2834	 0.03	 824	 0.07	 138	 0.05	 1156	 0.03	 402	 0.06	 +++	 	 +++	 ++	 	 +++
Consumer	 401	 0.10	 2834	 0.07	 824	 0.09	 138	 0.09	 1156	 0.05	 402	 0.08	 +++	 	 ++	 ++	 	 ++
Energy	 401	 0.03	 2834	 0.02	 824	 0.03	 138	 0.11	 1156	 0.04	 402	 0.06	 +	 	 ++	 +++	 ++	
Biotech/Healthcare	 401	 0.19	 2834	 0.20	 824	 0.19	 138	 0.21	 1156	 0.27	 402	 0.27	 	 	 	 -	 	
Financial	services	 401	 0.03	 2834	 0.02	 824	 0.03	 138	 0.04	 1156	 0.02	 402	 0.03	 	 	 	 	 	
Business	services	 401	 0.05	 2834	 0.02	 824	 0.03	 138	 0.03	 1156	 0.02	 402	 0.03	 +++	 ++	 +++	 	 	
Other	industries	 401	 0.06	 2834	 0.03	 824	 0.06	 138	 0.06	 1156	 0.03	 402	 0.06	 +++	 	 +++	 	 	 +++
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Table A3: Summary	statistics	–	Performance	funds		1990-2005	(UK	and	US)
Note:	The	last	three	columns	
report	whether	there	are	significant	
statistical	differences	in	the	means	
across	countries	and	samples	
(positive	or	negative).	+,++,+++	
(-,--,---)	indicate	significance	
at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	
and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	
Perf	and	Non-Perf	refer	to	
the	sample	of	firms	for	which	
performance	data	is	available	and	
unavailable	respectively.	A	dot	
indicates	missing	data	in	the	non-
performance	sample.			 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	
             UK               US    Test of  Test: Perf vs.  
             means Non-Perf 
 n mean sd min median max n mean sd min median max UK-US UK US
Fund	size	 119	 246.1	 590.6	 3.9	 75.4	 4769	 672	 309.2	 332.1	 5.6	 204.3	 2946	 	 +++	 +++
Number	of	investments	made	by	the	fund	 119	 25.13	 28.01	 1.0	 16.00	 140.0	 672	 52.4	 45.14	 1.00	 41.00	 295.0	 ---	 +++	 +++
Number	of	companies	invested	in	by	the	fund	 119	 15.59	 13.46	 1.00	 13.00	 68.0	 672	 22.41	 15.68	 1.00	 19.50	 123.0	 ---	 +++	 +++
Average	number	of	rounds	per	company	 119	 1.40	 0.62	 1.00	 1.20	 6.36	 672	 2.14	 0.76	 1.00	 2.05	 5.26	 ---	 +++	 +++
Share	of	companies	receiving	multiple	investments	 119	 0.23	 0.21	 0.00	 0.19	 0.91	 672	 0.52	 0.24	 0.00	 0.55	 1.00	 ---	 +++	 +++
First	investment	round	number	 119	 1.72	 0.75	 1.00	 1.46	 5.00	 672	 2.40	 0.97	 1.00	 2.27	 12.50	 ---	 	 ---
Average	size	of	investment	per	round	 119	 4.58	 5.78	 0.23	 2.31	 32.14	 672	 3.91	 5.13	 0.13	 2.79	 84.27	 	 +	 +++
Average	size	of	investment	at	first	investment	 119	 4.88	 6.06	 0.22	 2.31	 32.14	 672	 4.76	 5.93	 0.16	 3.39	 84.27	 	 ++	 +++
Average	size	of	investment	per	company	 119	 5.90	 6.53	 0.29	 3.17	 32.14	 672	 7.38	 6.98	 0.18	 5.72	 84.27	 --	 ++	 +++
Net	IRR	 119	 3.23	 16.01	 -21.80	 0.80	 76.00	 672	 9.91	 31.85	 -31.10	 2.00	 165.00	 ---	 .	 .
Multiples	 119	 1.21	 0.81	 0.12	 1.05	 5.35	 672	 1.59	 1.70	 0.12	 1.08	 9.84	 ---	 .	 .
Share	of	IPO	exits	 119	 0.12	 0.14	 0.00	 0.07	 0.67	 672	 0.12	 0.13	 0.00	 0.09	 1.00	 	 	 ---
Share	of	M&A	exits	 119	 0.23	 0.20	 0.00	 0.23	 1.00	 672	 0.32	 0.18	 0.00	 0.32	 1.00	 ---	 	 ---
Average	number	of	syndication	partners	 119	 2.92	 1.37	 1.00	 2.75	 6.68	 672	 4.14	 1.53	 1.00	 4.06	 12.63	 ---	 .	 .
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	 119	 -2.09	 2.25	 -4.63	 -2.55	 2.87	 672	 -1.18	 2.28	 -4.83	 -0.80	 3.52	 ---	 	 +++
Sequence	number	of	fund	 119	 4.15	 7.53	 0.00	 1.00	 37.00	 672	 2.90	 3.39	 0.00	 2.00	 25.00	 +	 ++	 +++
Industry	specialisation	index	 119	 0.41	 0.26	 0.08	 0.33	 1.00	 672	 0.51	 0.24	 0.09	 0.45	 1.00	 ---	 ---	 ---
Hubs	(1	if	fund	located	in	a	hub)	 119	 0.72	 0.45	 0.00	 1.00	 1.00	 672	 0.52	 0.50	 0.00	 1.00	 1.00	 +++	 	 +++
Vintage	year	 119	 1999	 3.65	 1990	 1999	 2005	 672	 1999	 3.78	 1990	 1999	 2005	 	 ---	 ---
Number	of	partners	of	GP	at	fund	vintage	 30	 4.93	 1.39	 2.00	 5.50	 6.00	 350	 5.13	 3.17	 1.00	 4.00	 20.00	 	 .	 .
Number	of	offices	of	GP	at	fund	vintage	 11	 10.00	 5.67	 1.00	 11.00	 15.00	 415	 1.81	 1.76	 1.00	 1.00	 22.00	 +++	 .	 .
Proportion of capital invested into:               
UK	companies	 119	 0.66	 0.38	 0.00	 0.84	 1.00	 672	 0.01	 0.04	 0.00	 0.00	 0.49	 +++	 	
US	companies	 119	 0.11	 0.22	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.94	 0.16	 0.00	 1.00	 1.00	 ---	 --	
CE	companies	 119	 0.15	 0.27	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.02	 0.09	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 +++	 	
Other	companies	 119	 0.07	 0.23	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.03	 0.12	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 	 	 -
Fund Stage focus:               
Early-stage	 119	 0.32	 0.47	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.27	 0.44	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 	 ---	 ---
Expansion	 119	 0.15	 0.36	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.09	 0.29	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 +	 	 ---
Mezzanine	 119	 0.03	 0.16	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.08	 0.27	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 ---	 	 +++
Generalist	 119	 0.35	 0.48	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.52	 0.50	 0.00	 1.00	 1.00	 ---	 +++	 +++
Balanced	 119	 0.15	 0.36	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.04	 0.19	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 +++	 --	 ---
Proportion of capital invested in:               
Internet	and	computer	 119	 0.26	 0.27	 0.00	 0.21	 1.00	 672	 0.39	 0.28	 0.00	 0.38	 1.00	 ---	 -	 ---
Communications	and	electronics	 119	 0.17	 0.21	 0.00	 0.09	 1.00	 672	 0.19	 0.18	 0.00	 0.15	 1.00	 	 	 --
Business/Industrial	 119	 0.07	 0.13	 0.00	 0.00	 0.57	 672	 0.03	 0.10	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 +++	 	
Consumer	 119	 0.12	 0.18	 0.00	 0.01	 0.88	 672	 0.07	 0.16	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 +++	 	
Energy	 119	 0.04	 0.13	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.02	 0.08	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 	 	
Biotech/Healthcare	 119	 0.20	 0.27	 0.00	 0.11	 1.00	 672	 0.24	 0.32	 0.00	 0.09	 1.00	 	 	 +++
Financial	services	 119	 0.02	 0.06	 0.00	 0.00	 0.44	 672	 0.02	 0.06	 0.00	 0.00	 0.51	 	 -	
Business	services	 119	 0.07	 0.14	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 672	 0.02	 0.07	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 +++	 	
Other	industries	 119	 0.05	 0.12	 0.00	 0.00	 0.62	 672	 0.02	 0.07	 0.00	 0.00	 0.57	 +++	 	
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Table A4: Summary	statistics	–	Public	vs.	Private	funds		(Performance	funds	1990-2005		in	the	UK	and	US)	
Note:	The	last	four	columns	report	whether	
there	are	significant	statistical	differences	in	
the	means	between	public	and	private	funds	
in	the	UK	and	the	US	(positive	or	negative).	
+,++,+++	(-,--,---)	indicate	significance	at	
the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	
level	respectively.	
                UK                  US        Test of means  
             Public            Private             Public            Private             UK-US       Public-Private 
   n mean n mean n mean n mean Public Private UK US
Fund	size	 50	 64.81	 69	 377.4	 42	 182.0	 630	 317.6	 ---	 	 ---	 ---
Number	of	investments	made	by	the	fund	 50	 23.04	 69	 26.64	 42	 47.0	 630	 52.74	 ---	 ---	 	
Number	of	companies	invested	in	by	the	fund	 50	 16.12	 69	 15.20	 42	 19.90	 630	 22.58	 	 ---	 	
Average	number	of	rounds	per	company	 50	 1.33	 69	 1.45	 42	 2.14	 630	 2.14	 ---	 ---	 	
Share	of	companies	receiving	multiple	investments	 50	 0.21	 69	 0.24	 42	 0.50	 630	 0.52	 ---	 ---	 	
First	investment	round	number	 50	 1.59	 69	 1.81	 42	 2.37	 630	 2.40	 ---	 ---	 	
Average	size	of	investment	per	round	 50	 1.61	 69	 6.73	 42	 2.53	 630	 4.00	 --	 +++	 ---	 ---
Average	size	of	investment	at	first	investment	 50	 1.68	 69	 7.20	 42	 3.09	 630	 4.88	 ---	 +++	 ---	 ---
Average	size	of	investment	per	company	 50	 2.16	 69	 8.60	 42	 4.81	 630	 7.55	 ---	 	 ---	 ---
Net	IRR	 50	 -2.02	 69	 7.04	 42	 4.13	 630	 10.29	 -	 	 ---	 -
Multiples	 50	 0.99	 69	 1.37	 42	 1.29	 630	 1.61	 -	 -	 ---	 -
Share	of	IPO	exits	 50	 0.10	 69	 0.13	 42	 0.06	 630	 0.13	 +	 	 	 ---
Share	of	M&A	exits	 50	 0.18	 69	 0.27	 42	 0.26	 630	 0.32	 --	 -	 --	 -
Average	number	of	syndication	partners	 50	 2.80	 69	 3.01	 42	 3.55	 630	 4.18	 --	 ---	 	 --
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	 50	 -2.51	 69	 -1.78	 42	 -2.47	 630	 -1.09	 	 --	 -	 ---
Sequence	number	of	fund	 50	 1.90	 69	 5.78	 42	 1.12	 630	 3.02	 +	 ++	 ---	 ---
Industry	specialisation	index	 50	 0.37	 69	 0.44	 42	 0.47	 630	 0.51	 --	 --	 	
Hubs	(1	if	fund	located	in	a	hub)	 50	 0.54	 69	 0.86	 42	 0.31	 630	 0.53	 ++	 +++	 ---	 ---
Vintage	year	 50	 2000	 69	 1997	 42	 2000	 630	 1999	 	 ---	 +++	 +++
Number	of	partners	of	GP	at	fund	vintage	 6	 5.67	 24	 4.75	 12	 3.50	 338	 5.19	 ++	 	 ++	 -
Number	of	offices	of	GP	at	fund	vintage	 2	 1.00	 9	 12.00	 23	 1.35	 392	 1.84	 --	 +++	 ---	 --
Proportion of capital invested into:            
UK	companies	 50	 0.91	 69	 0.48	 42	 0.00	 630	 0.01	 +++	 +++	 +++	 ---
US	companies	 50	 0.05	 69	 0.16	 42	 0.99	 630	 0.94	 ---	 ---	 ---	 +++
CE	companies	 50	 0.03	 69	 0.24	 42	 0.01	 630	 0.02	 +	 +++	 ---	 --
Other	companies	 50	 0.00	 69	 0.11	 42	 0.00	 630	 0.04	 	 ++	 ---	 ---
Fund Stage focus:            
Early-stage	 50	 0.44	 69	 0.23	 42	 0.19	 630	 0.27	 +++	 	 ++	
Expansion	 50	 0.26	 69	 0.07	 42	 0.07	 630	 0.09	 ++	 	 +++	
Mezzanine	 50	 0.00	 69	 0.04	 42	 0.17	 630	 0.07	 ---	 	 -	
Generalist	 50	 0.16	 69	 0.49	 42	 0.55	 630	 0.52	 ---	 	 ---	
Balanced	 50	 0.14	 69	 0.16	 42	 0.02	 630	 0.04	 ++	 +++	 	
Proportion of capital invested in:            
Internet	and	computer	 50	 0.27	 69	 0.25	 42	 0.36	 630	 0.39	 	 ---	 	
Communications	and	electronics	 50	 0.15	 69	 0.19	 42	 0.16	 630	 0.19	 	 	 	
Business/Industrial	 50	 0.06	 69	 0.09	 42	 0.09	 630	 0.03	 	 +++	 	 ++
Consumer	 50	 0.11	 69	 0.12	 42	 0.06	 630	 0.07	 	 ++	 	
Energy	 50	 0.06	 69	 0.02	 42	 0.01	 630	 0.02	 ++	 	 	 --
Biotech/Healthcare	 50	 0.22	 69	 0.18	 42	 0.23	 630	 0.24	 	 	 	
Financial	services	 50	 0.01	 69	 0.03	 42	 0.03	 630	 0.02	 --	 	 -	
Business	services	 50	 0.07	 69	 0.06	 42	 0.04	 630	 0.02	 	 ++	 	
Other	industries	 50	 0.05	 69	 0.06	 42	 0.03	 630	 0.02	 	 ++	 	
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Table A5: UK-US	performance	gap	over	time	(with	and	without	controls)
      Net IRR           Multiple  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
UK-based	fund	 -6.676**	 -7.439***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.371**	 -0.399***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (3.120)	 (2.743)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.147)	 (0.132)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
UK-based	fund	raised	1990-1993	 	 	 -17.543***	-15.886***	-16.851***	-15.846**	 -14.334**	 -15.618**	 -19.326***	-11.161**	 -24.299**	 	 	 -1.214***	 -1.106***	 -1.159***	 -1.051**	 -0.980**	 -1.067**	 -1.220***	 -0.842**	 -1.912*
	 	 	 (6.417)	 (5.833)	 (5.783)	 (6.846)	 (6.600)	 (6.839)	 (6.564)	 (5.246)	 (11.755)	 	 	 (0.420)	 (0.379)	 (0.378)	 (0.416)	 (0.400)	 (0.418)	 (0.412)	 (0.338)	 (1.034)
UK-based	fund	raised	1994-1997	 	 	 -24.685***	-23.096***	-23.481***	-21.419***	-21.344***	-20.770***	-23.220***	-16.845**	 -14.878	 	 	 -1.210***	 -1.111***	 -1.144***	 -1.076***	 -1.075***	 -1.043***	 -1.143***	 -0.843***	 -0.443
	 	 	 (8.505)	 (8.170)	 (8.066)	 (8.125)	 (7.589)	 (7.527)	 (7.547)	 (6.868)	 (11.629)	 	 	 (0.391)	 (0.372)	 (0.371)	 (0.362)	 (0.339)	 (0.338)	 (0.343)	 (0.306)	 (0.664)
UK-based	fund	raised	1998-2001	 	 	 -0.085	 2.330	 2.670	 3.597	 4.561*	 4.753*	 1.995	 1.901	 10.166*	 	 	 -0.037	 0.095	 0.108	 0.134	 0.197	 0.210	 0.096	 0.059	 0.442
	 	 	 (2.032)	 (2.194)	 (2.265)	 (2.514)	 (2.413)	 (2.700)	 (2.765)	 (2.820)	 (5.297)	 	 	 (0.093)	 (0.104)	 (0.113)	 (0.130)	 (0.132)	 (0.149)	 (0.153)	 (0.155)	 (0.303)
UK-based	fund	raised	2002-2005	 	 	 -2.329	 -0.137	 0.094	 2.269	 0.886	 1.945	 -0.961	 -0.964	 5.663	 	 	 -0.022	 0.108	 0.096	 0.189	 0.119	 0.180	 0.061	 0.028	 0.326
	 	 	 (1.897)	 (2.280)	 (2.472)	 (2.745)	 (2.885)	 (3.271)	 (3.563)	 (3.778)	 (5.453)	 	 	 (0.068)	 (0.098)	 (0.108)	 (0.130)	 (0.142)	 (0.160)	 (0.174)	 (0.179)	 (0.295)
Fund	size	$85m-$191m	 	 	 	 6.220**	 6.507**	 6.276**	 4.501	 3.858	 2.417	 1.970	 2.632	 	 	 	 0.453***	 0.486***	 0.468***	 0.377**	 0.351**	 0.291*	 0.256	 0.435
	 	 	 	 (3.008)	 (3.092)	 (3.091)	 (3.042)	 (2.916)	 (2.879)	 (2.889)	 (5.879)	 	 	 	 (0.171)	 (0.177)	 (0.175)	 (0.168)	 (0.164)	 (0.161)	 (0.160)	 (0.350)
Fund	size	$191m-$365m	 	 	 	 7.642**	 7.990**	 7.587**	 3.716	 2.974	 0.402	 1.012	 0.931	 	 	 	 0.478***	 0.524***	 0.500***	 0.303*	 0.287*	 0.181	 0.189	 0.189
	 	 	 	 (3.405)	 (3.467)	 (3.396)	 (2.968)	 (3.065)	 (3.113)	 (3.039)	 (6.392)	 	 	 	 (0.184)	 (0.191)	 (0.187)	 (0.161)	 (0.165)	 (0.164)	 (0.161)	 (0.338)
Fund	size	>$365m	 	 	 	 6.362**	 6.940**	 6.529**	 0.485	 -0.812	 -4.198	 -2.052	 -2.051	 	 	 	 0.289**	 0.364***	 0.323**	 0.013	 -0.010	 -0.149	 -0.072	 -0.088
	 	 	 	 (2.701)	 (2.878)	 (2.938)	 (2.746)	 (2.975)	 (3.241)	 (3.004)	 (5.510)	 	 	 	 (0.124)	 (0.139)	 (0.142)	 (0.139)	 (0.142)	 (0.149)	 (0.143)	 (0.283)
Industry	specialisation	index	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.897	 5.046	 3.861	 4.850	 8.471	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.355	 0.325	 0.276	 0.316	 0.546
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5.021)	 (4.905)	 (4.735)	 (4.928)	 (10.188)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.270)	 (0.257)	 (0.247)	 (0.259)	 (0.547)
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 2.078***	 1.964***	 1.940***	 1.454**	 4.347***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.110***	 0.106***	 0.105***	 0.079**	 0.180***
market	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.591)	 (0.622)	 (0.601)	 (0.592)	 (1.206)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.032)	 (0.034)	 (0.033)	 (0.032)	 (0.066)
Number	of	companies	invested	in	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.042	 0.058	 0.036	 0.008	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.000	 0.001	 -0.000	 0.006
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.094)	 (0.093)	 (0.089)	 (0.131)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)
Average	amount	of	first	investment	made	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.030	 0.009	 -0.163	 0.171	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.001	 -0.000	 -0.009	 0.020
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.119)	 (0.122)	 (0.145)	 (0.278)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.012)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -2.407**	 -2.401**	 -3.308***	 -0.100	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.128**	 -0.127**	 -0.171***	 0.028
a	company	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.117)	 (1.071)	 (1.168)	 (1.894)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.057)	 (0.055)	 (0.055)	 (0.096)
Average	number	of	syndication	partners	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1.592	 1.321	 1.084	 2.200	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.092*	 0.081*	 0.067	 0.106
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.992)	 (0.955)	 (0.985)	 (1.781)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.050)	 (0.048)	 (0.050)	 (0.093)
Hub	dummy	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 7.435***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.306***	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2.214)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.117)	 	
Share	of	IPO	exits	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 58.226***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 3.033***	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (10.197)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.602)	
Share	of	M&A	exits	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 11.180*	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.480	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (6.314)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.294)	
Excess	Net	IRR	of	last	fund	of	GP	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.265**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.108)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Excess	Multiple	of	last	fund	of	GP	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.315**
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.124)
Year	FE	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Stage	Controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Industry	Controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
No.	of	Observations	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 259	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 264
R-Squared	 0.006	 0.244	 0.259	 0.267	 0.270	 0.286	 0.303	 0.310	 0.322	 0.350	 0.504	 0.007	 0.228	 0.242	 0.255	 0.262	 0.279	 0.296	 0.303	 0.311	 0.342	 0.539
Note: Columns	1	and	2	look	at	how	controlling	for	fund	vintage	year	affects	the	historic	underperformance	of	UK	funds.	From	column	3	onwards	we	analyse	how	
the	performance	changed	over	time,	which	allows	us	to	observe	the	convergence	in	performance.	We	then	add	additional	controls	to	examine	how	they	affect	our	
convergence	findings.	Size	variables	refer	to	quartiles	of	the	size	distribution	with	the	bottom	quartile	omitted	as	a	reference	quartile.	The	regression	models	in	
this	table	have	been	estimated	with	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS).	The	table	reports	standard	errors	in	parentheses	clustered	at	the	fund	manager	level.	*,	**,	***	
indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	The	right	panel	reproduces	the	same	regressions	but	considering	
multiples	instead	of	net	IRR	as	dependent	variable.		
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Table A6: Investments	location	and	fund	performance
 Net IRR    Multiple   
 US Funds UK Funds US Funds UK Funds US Funds UK Funds US Funds UK Funds
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fund	size	$85m-$191m	 6.415*	 -3.667	 6.890*	 2.540	 0.497**	 -0.075	 0.544***	 0.222
	 (3.635)	 (4.392)	 (3.615)	 (3.389)	 (0.205)	 (0.241)	 (0.203)	 (0.189)
Fund	size	$191m-$365m	 7.145*	 2.248	 7.845**	 4.398	 0.509**	 0.124	 0.558***	 0.190
	 (3.839)	 (6.174)	 (3.762)	 (5.295)	 (0.212)	 (0.313)	 (0.209)	 (0.291)
Fund	size	>$365m	 5.956*	 4.867	 6.695**	 14.247***	 0.320*	 0.159	 0.377**	 0.595***
	 (3.418)	 (8.240)	 (3.373)	 (5.323)	 (0.167)	 (0.365)	 (0.164)	 (0.203)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 -24.542**	 4.408	 	 	 -1.627**	 0.262	 	
UK	companies	 (12.409)	 (8.231)	 	 	 (0.704)	 (0.394)	 	
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 2.339	 13.104	 	 	 0.525	 0.695*	 	
CE	companies	 (6.338)	 (10.774)	 	 	 (0.414)	 (0.367)	 	
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 11.593	 9.707	 	 	 0.561	 0.556	 	
companies	in	other	regions	 (12.057)	 (12.372)	 	 	 (0.676)	 (0.549)	 	
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 -107.189***	-27.796**	 	 	 -8.216***	 -1.846**
UK	companies	90-93	 	 	 (35.247)	 (11.344)	 	 	 (3.144)	 (0.888)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 -288.534***	2.339	 	 	 -11.758**	 0.408
UK	companies	94-97	 	 	 (110.825)	 (22.628)	 	 	 (4.700)	 (1.128)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 -17.237	 10.381**	 	 	 -1.062	 0.592**
UK	companies	98-01	 	 	 (13.133)	 (4.624)	 	 	 (0.707)	 (0.247)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 15.263	 8.190	 	 	 0.911	 0.107
UK	companies	02-05	 	 	 (24.539)	 (15.705)	 	 	 (1.246)	 (0.732)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 -12.481	 -17.269	 	 	 1.261	 -1.398
CE	companies	90-93	 	 	 (8.993)	 (17.310)	 	 	 (1.966)	 (1.233)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 -153.849**	54.936	 	 	 -5.249**	 2.952***
CE	companies	94-97	 	 	 (64.715)	 (33.505)	 	 	 (2.552)	 (0.743)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 3.619	 10.662*	 	 	 0.152	 0.589**
CE	companies	98-01	 	 	 (8.100)	 (6.022)	 	 	 (0.453)	 (0.285)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 16.283***	 0.109	 	 	 0.825***	 -0.364
CE	companies	02-05	 	 	 (5.771)	 (20.891)	 	 	 (0.270)	 (0.897)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 84.056	 -519.444	 	 	 5.619	 11.002
other	regions	companies	90-93	 	 	 (76.628)	 (472.082)	 	 	 (8.236)	 (27.233)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 -42.088***	 94.937***	 	 	 -2.250***	 4.466***
other	regions	companies	94-97	 	 	 (11.614)	 (23.733)	 	 	 (0.604)	 (0.839)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 26.443**	 -1.986	 	 	 1.498**	 0.062
other	regions	companies	98-01	 	 	 (11.241)	 (6.535)	 	 	 (0.649)	 (0.316)
Proportion	of	investments	made	to	 	 	 15.852**	 -12.807	 	 	 0.453	 -0.614
other	regions	companies	02-05	 	 	 (7.631)	 (14.489)	 	 	 (0.422)	 (0.697)
Year	FE	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Stage	Controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Industry	Controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
No.	of	Observations	 672	 119	 672	 119	 672	 119	 672	 119
R-Squared	 0.293	 0.463	 0.312	 0.690	 0.287	 0.457	 0.303	 0.639
Note: Columns	1	and	2	examine	how	investing	in	different	regions	as	opposed	to	the	US	affected	the	performance	of	
both	US	and	UK	funds.	Columns	3	and	4	look	at	how	this	evolved	over	time.	Size	variables	refer	to	quartiles	of	the	size	
distribution	with	the	bottom	quartile	omitted	as	a	reference	quartile.	The	regression	models	in	this	table	have	been	
estimated	with	OLS.	The	table	reports	standard	errors	in	parentheses	clustered	at	the	fund	manager	level.	*,	**,	***	indicate	
statistical	significance	at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	The	right	panel	reproduces	the	same	
regressions	but	considering	multiples	instead	of	net	IRR	as	dependent	variable.	
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Table A7: Distribution	of	returns	(Quantile	regression)
   Net IRR     Multiple     Net IRR     Multiple
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
 95 75 50 25 5 95 75 50 25 5 95 75 50 25 5 95 75 50 25 5
UK-based	fund	raised	1990-1993	 -43.300***	-15.100**	 -10.100*	 -19.500***	 -8.554*	 -4.820***	 -1.250***	 -0.509**	 -0.910***	 -0.200**	 -29.737***	 -18.413***	 -5.808	 -15.670**	 -0.730	 -4.040***	 -1.267***	 -0.387*	 -0.729***	 -0.056
	 (4.870)	 (6.585)	 (5.203)	 (5.345)	 (4.510)	 (0.230)	 (0.296)	 (0.217)	 (0.115)	 (0.086)	 (11.399)	 (5.159)	 (4.363)	 (7.794)	 (6.015)	 (0.301)	 (0.332)	 (0.226)	 (0.234)	 (0.161)
UK-based	fund	raised	1994-1997	 -89.000***	-36.200***	 -12.960***	 -2.400	 9.800	 -4.937***	 -1.420***	 -0.330**	 -0.360***	 -0.090	 -76.951***	 -32.907***	 -11.581***	 -1.457	 14.120*	 -4.154***	 -1.422***	 -0.378**	 -0.290*	 0.224
	 (2.995)	 (5.806)	 (3.746)	 (4.030)	 (8.319)	 (0.596)	 (0.225)	 (0.161)	 (0.101)	 (0.085)	 (10.455)	 (3.828)	 (3.105)	 (4.823)	 (7.711)	 (0.324)	 (0.250)	 (0.175)	 (0.155)	 (0.218)
UK-based	fund	raised	1998-2001	 -4.100	 -0.500	 1.330	 1.100	 5.700	 -0.170	 0.070	 0.059	 0.050	 0.060	 -0.636	 -1.112	 2.141	 3.549	 8.510	 -0.042	 0.008	 0.042	 0.155	 0.066
	 (6.249)	 (3.689)	 (2.516)	 (2.636)	 (5.868)	 (0.384)	 (0.149)	 (0.109)	 (0.064)	 (0.111)	 (16.169)	 (2.651)	 (2.271)	 (3.793)	 (6.960)	 (0.335)	 (0.177)	 (0.117)	 (0.119)	 (0.178)
UK-based	fund	raised	2002-2005	 -10.000	 -4.200	 -1.740	 -1.553	 2.500	 -0.110	 0.030	 -0.030	 -0.010	 0.120	 -4.641	 -3.676	 0.668	 -0.403	 -4.890	 -0.167	 0.024	 0.073	 0.043	 0.095
	 (9.142)	 (5.854)	 (3.844)	 (4.176)	 (5.024)	 (0.273)	 (0.221)	 (0.167)	 (0.096)	 (0.196)	 (24.605)	 (4.125)	 (3.260)	 (5.364)	 (4.408)	 (0.303)	 (0.244)	 (0.172)	 (0.157)	 (0.255)
Fund	size	$85m-$191m	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 5.381	 3.037	 1.855	 2.112	 1.488	 0.494**	 0.086	 0.075	 0.151**	 0.040
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (8.119)	 (1.848)	 (1.519)	 (2.506)	 (3.377)	 (0.244)	 (0.120)	 (0.080)	 (0.076)	 (0.108)
Fund	size	$191m-$365m	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 2.123	 3.368*	 -0.289	 0.006	 0.832	 0.325	 0.145	 0.017	 0.048	 0.067
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (8.963)	 (2.042)	 (1.726)	 (2.812)	 (4.117)	 (0.247)	 (0.132)	 (0.090)	 (0.086)	 (0.111)
Fund	size	>$365m	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -3.412	 0.305	 0.019	 2.118	 0.829	 -0.287	 0.021	 -0.004	 0.107	 0.078
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (11.193)	 (2.558)	 (2.142)	 (3.443)	 (4.421)	 (0.271)	 (0.165)	 (0.111)	 (0.107)	 (0.133)
Industry	specialisation	index	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 14.329	 5.519*	 1.114	 -2.719	 6.464	 0.728*	 0.147	 0.052	 -0.048	 0.057
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (14.290)	 (3.332)	 (2.866)	 (4.729)	 (6.184)	 (0.422)	 (0.221)	 (0.149)	 (0.144)	 (0.153)
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1.286	 1.127***	 0.675**	 0.275	 1.519***	 0.120**	 0.026	 0.021	 0.006	 0.006
at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.720)	 (0.337)	 (0.276)	 (0.429)	 (0.540)	 (0.051)	 (0.021)	 (0.014)	 (0.013)	 (0.016)
Number	of	companies	invested	in	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.043	 -0.080	 0.043	 0.076	 0.191*	 -0.004	 -0.004	 0.000	 0.003	 0.005*
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.294)	 (0.056)	 (0.045)	 (0.076)	 (0.102)	 (0.007)	 (0.004)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)
Average	amount	of	first	investment	made	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.134	 0.064	 0.075	 0.170	 0.217	 -0.003	 0.001	 0.002	 0.006	 -0.001
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.362)	 (0.101)	 (0.083)	 (0.111)	 (0.134)	 (0.010)	 (0.006)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -1.839	 -2.191***	 -0.395	 0.127	 -0.994	 -0.142	 -0.101**	 -0.022	 0.001	 0.003
a	company	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.833)	 (0.751)	 (0.636)	 (0.950)	 (1.232)	 (0.093)	 (0.048)	 (0.033)	 (0.028)	 (0.041)
Average	number	of	syndication	partners	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.562	 -0.145	 0.091	 0.213	 -0.228	 0.046	 0.016	 -0.002	 -0.002	 -0.002
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2.901)	 (0.543)	 (0.428)	 (0.698)	 (1.129)	 (0.076)	 (0.035)	 (0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.035)
Year	FE	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Stage	Controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Industry	Controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
No.	of	Observations	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791
Note: The	regression	models	discussed	in	this	table	have	been	estimated	using	quantile	regression	at	different	percentiles	of	the	performance	distribution	(from	
those	funds	at	the	95th	percentile	to	those	at	the	bottom	5	per	cent	percentile).	The	first	5	columns	look	at	these	regressions	controlling	only	for	the	vintage	
year	of	the	fund,	the	following	5	columns	look	at	them	when	controls	are	added.	Size	variables	refer	to	quartiles	of	the	size	distribution	with	the	bottom	quartile	
omitted	as	a	reference	quartile.	The	table	reports	standard	errors	in	parentheses	clustered	at	the	fund	manager	level.	*,	**,	***	indicate	statistical	significance	
at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	The	right	panel	reproduces	the	same	regressions	but	considering	multiples	instead	of	net	IRR	as	
dependent	variable.
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Table A8: Fund	performance	drivers	across	countries	and	over	time
              Net IRR               Multiple      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	UK	 2.240*	 	 1.839	 	 2.564*	 	 0.078	 	 0.051	 	 0.067	
	 (1.177)	 	 (1.166)	 	 (1.370)	 	 (0.058)	 	 (0.053)	 	 (0.106)	
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	US	 1.945***	 	 1.377**	 	 4.860***	 	 0.110***	 	 0.082**	 	 0.196**	
	 (0.672)	 	 (0.638)	 	 (1.483)	 	 (0.037)	 	 (0.034)	 	 (0.082)	
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	a	company	UK	 -5.883**	 	 -4.146	 	 -0.430	 	 -0.179	 	 -0.110	 	 0.126	
	 (2.614)	 	 (2.589)	 	 (3.687)	 	 (0.167)	 	 (0.147)	 	 (0.226)	
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	a	company	US	 -2.109*	 	 -3.449***	 	 0.019	 	 -0.122**	 	 -0.182***	 	 0.031	
	 (1.154)	 	 (1.238)	 	 (1.992)	 	 (0.058)	 	 (0.058)	 	 (0.102)	
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage		90-93	 	 4.463***	 	 3.765***	 	 4.595	 	 0.371***	 	 0.320***	 	 0.434*
	 	 (1.107)	 	 (1.099)	 	 (2.987)	 	 (0.087)	 	 (0.087)	 	 (0.241)
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	94-97	 	 5.651***	 	 3.556**	 	 13.226***	 	 0.272***	 	 0.171**	 	 0.539***
	 	 (1.633)	 	 (1.604)	 	 (2.876)	 	 (0.081)	 	 (0.076)	 	 (0.151)
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	98-01	 	 -0.143	 	 -0.020	 	 0.211	 	 -0.023	 	 -0.015	 	 -0.027
	 	 (0.539)	 	 (0.502)	 	 (1.215)	 	 (0.030)	 	 (0.028)	 	 (0.066)
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	fund	vintage	02-05	 	 0.193	 	 0.304	 	 0.067	 	 0.003	 	 0.008	 	 -0.054
	 	 (0.538)	 	 (0.542)	 	 (1.294)	 	 (0.021)	 	 (0.021)	 	 (0.076)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	a	company	90-93	 	 -0.654	 	 -2.165	 	 4.764	 	 -0.069	 	 -0.166	 	 0.512
	 	 (1.719)	 	 (1.710)	 	 (5.051)	 	 (0.116)	 	 (0.117)	 	 (0.391)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	a	company	94-97	 	 -2.337	 	 -6.759	 	 -5.404	 	 -0.068	 	 -0.265	 	 -0.085
	 	 (5.141)	 	 (5.169)	 	 (7.213)	 	 (0.238)	 	 (0.233)	 	 (0.351)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	a	company	98-01	 	 -2.706**	 	 -2.184**	 	 -1.038	 	 -0.136**	 	 -0.093*	 	 -0.052
	 	 (1.257)	 	 (1.026)	 	 (2.077)	 	 (0.059)	 	 (0.050)	 	 (0.105)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	a	company	02-05	 	 -1.834*	 	 -1.192	 	 1.151	 	 -0.070	 	 -0.039	 	 0.134
	 	 (1.036)	 	 (1.005)	 	 (1.638)	 	 (0.048)	 	 (0.045)	 	 (0.090)
Share	of	IPO	exits	for	UK	funds	 	 	 21.255**	 	 	 	 	 	 1.537**	 	 	
	 	 	 (10.580)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.647)	 	 	
Share	of	IPO	exits	for	US	funds	 	 	 68.873***	 	 	 	 	 	 3.508***	 	 	
	 	 	 (12.095)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.728)	 	 	
Share	of	M&A	exits	for	UK	funds	 	 	 -4.200	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.007	 	 	
	 	 	 (9.693)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.517)	 	 	
Share	of	M&A	exits	for	US	funds	 	 	 16.801**	 	 	 	 	 	 0.641*	 	 	
	 	 	 (7.374)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.345)	 	 	
Share	of	IPO	exits	for	funds	raised:1990-1993	 	 	 	 46.632***	 	 	 	 	 	 3.027**	 	
	 	 	 	 (17.180)	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.268)	 	
Share	of	IPO	exits	for	funds	raised:1994-1997	 	 	 	 119.806***	 	 	 	 	 6.056***	 	
	 	 	 	 (25.382)	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.248)	 	
Share	of	IPO	exits	for	funds	raised:1998-2001	 	 	 	 30.428***	 	 	 	 	 	 1.266**	 	
	 	 	 	 (8.821)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.502)	 	
Share	of	IPO	exits	for	funds	raised:2002-2005	 	 	 	 21.429**	 	 	 	 	 	 0.973**	 	
	 	 	 	 (10.591)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.455)	 	
Share	of	M&A	exits	for	funds	raised:1990-1993	 	 	 	 27.136*	 	 	 	 	 	 1.668	 	
	 	 	 	 (14.801)	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.063)	 	
52 53
	
              Net IRR               Multiple      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Share	of	M&A	exits	for	funds	raised:1994-1997	 	 	 	 62.538***	 	 	 	 	 	 2.699***	 	
	 	 	 	 (21.278)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.984)	 	
Share	of	M&A	exits	for	funds	raised:1998-2001	 	 	 	 -11.038*	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.735**	 	
	 	 	 	 (6.585)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.309)	 	
Share	of	M&A	exits	for	funds	raised:2002-2005	 	 	 	 -12.330	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.462	 	
	 	 	 	 (8.454)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.332)	 	
Excess	Performance	of	last	fund	of	GP	UK	 	 	 	 	 0.195	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.000	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.172)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.163)	
Excess	Performance	of	last	fund	of	GP	US	 	 	 	 	 0.262**	 	 	 	 	 	 0.319**	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.114)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.129)	
Excess	Performance	of	last	fund	of	GP	90-93	 	 	 	 	 	 1.327***	 	 	 	 	 	 0.615*
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.493)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.347)
Excess	Performance	of	last	fund	of	GP	94-97	 	 	 	 	 	 0.463**	 	 	 	 	 	 0.339*
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.179)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.195)
Excess	Performance	of	last	fund	of	GP	98-01	 	 	 	 	 	 0.132	 	 	 	 	 	 0.202
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.100)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.160)
Excess	Performance	of	last	fund	of	GP	02-05	 	 	 	 	 	 0.338	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.022
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.207)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.206)
Year	FE	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Stage	Controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Industry	Controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Additional	Controls^	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
No.	of	Observations	 791	 791	 791	 791	 259	 259	 791	 791	 791	 791	 264	 264
R-Squared	 0.311	 0.343	 0.356	 0.412	 0.506	 0.600	 0.304	 0.347	 0.346	 0.408	 0.542	 0.591
^	Additional	controls	refer	to	controls	for	industry	specialisation,	number	of	companies	invested	in,	the	average	amount	of	the	first	investment	made	and	the	
average	number	of	syndication	partners	invested	alongside.
Note: Columns	1-2	investigate	the	influence	of	GP	experience	and	investing	early	across	countries	and	over	time.	Columns	3-6	look	at	exit	rates	and	
persistence(excess	performance	refers	to	performance	in	excess	of	the	market	benchmark)	over	time	and	across	countries	in	the	presence	of	controls	for	GP	
experience	and	the	round	of	investment.	Size	variables	refer	to	quartiles	of	the	size	distribution	with	the	bottom	quartile	omitted	as	a	reference	quartile.	The	
regression	models	in	this	table	have	been	estimated	with	OLS.	The	table	reports	standard	errors	in	parentheses	clustered	at	the	fund	manager	level.	*,	**,	***	
indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	The	right	panel	reproduces	the	same	regressions	but	considering	
multiples	instead	of	net	IRR	as	dependent	variable.
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	 	Table A9: Investor	hubs	and	fund	performance
 Net IRR   Multiple  
 1 2 3 4 5 6
Hub	dummy	for	funds	raised	1990-1993	 9.019	 	 	 0.359	 	
	 (5.638)	 	 	 (0.488)	 	
Hub	dummy	for	funds	raised	1994-1997	 25.864***	 	 	 1.225***	 	
	 (7.462)	 	 	 (0.363)	 	
Hub	dummy	for	funds	raised	1998-2001	 1.774	 	 	 0.052	 	
	 (2.143)	 	 	 (0.110)	 	
Hub	dummy	for	funds	raised	2002-2005	 1.013	 	 	 -0.060	 	
	 (2.203)	 	 	 (0.096)	 	
London	funds	(relative	to	rest	of	UK)	 	 5.731*	 	 	 0.174	
	 	 (3.327)	 	 	 (0.174)	
Silicon	Valley	funds	 	 9.363***	 	 	 0.409**	
	 	 (3.479)	 	 	 (0.190)	
New	York	funds	 	 4.027	 	 	 0.148	
	 	 (3.142)	 	 	 (0.147)	
Massachusetts	funds	 	 7.540*	 	 	 0.314	
	 	 (4.142)	 	 	 (0.221)	
London	funds	raised	1990-1993	 	 	 18.509	 	 	 0.651
	 	 	 (12.997)	 	 	 (0.808)
London	funds	raised	1994-1997	 	 	 10.647	 	 	 0.403
	 	 	 (7.077)	 	 	 (0.389)
London	funds	raised	1998-2001	 	 	 1.935	 	 	 0.028
	 	 	 (3.618)	 	 	 (0.206)
London	funds	raised	2002-2005	 	 	 0.990	 	 	 -0.136
	 	 	 (4.490)	 	 	 (0.181)
Silicon	Valley	funds	raised	1990-1993	 	 	 11.689	 	 	 0.463
	 	 	 (10.017)	 	 	 (0.943)
Silicon	Valley	funds	raised	1994-1997	 	 	 43.576***	 	 	 1.994***
	 	 	 (11.707)	 	 	 (0.585)
Silicon	Valley	funds	raised	1998-2001	 	 	 0.622	 	 	 0.006
	 	 	 (2.651)	 	 	 (0.144)
Silicon	Valley	funds	raised	2002-2005	 	 	 -1.344	 	 	 -0.129
	 	 	 (2.465)	 	 	 (0.104)
New	York	funds	1990-1993	 	 	 -15.825*	 	 	 -1.419**
	 	 	 (8.726)	 	 	 (0.599)
New	York	funds	1994-1997	 	 	 -3.664	 	 	 -0.067
	 	 	 (7.097)	 	 	 (0.307)
New	York	funds	1998-2001	 	 	 4.896*	 	 	 0.223
	 	 	 (2.819)	 	 	 (0.142)
New	York	funds	2002-2005	 	 	 11.680***	 	 	 0.390***
	 	 	 (4.438)	 	 	 (0.136)
Massachusetts	funds	1990-1993	 	 	 6.929	 	 	 0.023
	 	 	 (6.743)	 	 	 (0.550)
 Net IRR   Multiple  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Massachusetts	funds	1994-1997	 	 	 21.956*	 	 	 1.138*
	 	 	 (11.660)	 	 	 (0.634)
Massachusetts	funds	1998-2001	 	 	 3.957	 	 	 0.213
	 	 	 (4.285)	 	 	 (0.213)
Massachusetts	funds	2002-2005	 	 	 2.223	 	 	 -0.003
	 	 	 (2.369)	 	 	 (0.095)
Base	contols	included		 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Year	FE	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Stage	Controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Industry	Controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
No.	of	Observations	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791
R-Squared	 0.346	 0.325	 0.412	 0.331	 0.312	 0.399
^	Additional	controls	refer	to	controls	for	industry	specialisation,	number	of	companies	invested	in,	the	average	amount	of	the	first	investment	made	and	the	
average	number	of	syndication	partners	invested	alongside.
Note: Column	1	looks	at	the	performance	over	time	of	funds	located	in	four	largest	investor	hubs	(Silicon	Valley,	New	York,	Massachusetts	and	London).	Column	
2	examines	the	performance	of	different	individual	hubs,	the	US	hub	performance	relative	to	US	non-hub	funds	and	London	relative	to	UK	non-hub	funds.	
Column	3	looks	at	the	performance	of	the	individual	hubs	over	time.	Size	variables	refer	to	quartiles	of	the	size	distribution	with	the	bottom	quartile	omitted	as	a	
reference	quartile.	The	regression	models	discussed	in	this	table	have	been	estimated	with	OLS.	The	table	reports	standard	errors	in	parentheses	clustered	at	the	
fund	manager	level.	*,	**,	***	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	The	right	panel	reproduces	the	same	
regressions	but	considering	multiples	instead	of	net	IRR	as	dependent	variable.
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Table A10: Number	of	partners/offices	and	fund	performance
               Net IRR                  Multiple    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
UK-based	fund	raised	1994-1997	 -1.900	 2.678	 	 	 -0.802	 -0.302	 	 	 -1.900	 2.678	 	 	 -0.802	 -0.302	 	
	 (12.639)	 (12.477)	 	 	 (1.693)	 (1.605)	 	 	 (12.639)	 (12.477)	 	 	 (1.693)	 (1.605)	 	
UK-based	fund	raised	1998-2001	 -1.675	 3.515	 -18.131	 -12.689	 -0.268	 0.071	 -0.672	 0.598	 -1.675	 3.515	 -18.131	 -12.689	 -0.268	 0.071	 -0.672	 0.598
	 (6.209)	 (6.372)	 (22.958)	 (22.797)	 (0.689)	 (0.699)	 (1.328)	 (1.358)	 (6.209)	 (6.372)	 (22.958)	 (22.797)	 (0.689)	 (0.699)	 (1.328)	 (1.358)
UK-based	fund	raised	2002-2005	 4.344	 6.941	 11.177	 20.689	 0.010	 1.007	 	 1.053	 4.344	 6.941	 11.177	 20.689	 0.010	 1.007	 	 1.053
	 (13.885)	 (13.949)	 (33.118)	 (33.777)	 (1.650)	 (1.577)	 	 (1.575)	 (13.885)	 (13.949)	 (33.118)	 (33.777)	 (1.650)	 (1.577)	 	 (1.575)
Fund	size	$85m-$191m	 	 5.841	 	 4.650	 	 0.540*	 	 0.532*	 	 5.841	 	 4.650	 	 0.540*	 	 0.532*
	 	 (4.055)	 	 (3.860)	 	 (0.275)	 	 (0.275)	 	 (4.055)	 	 (3.860)	 	 (0.275)	 	 (0.275)
Fund	size	$191m-$365m	 	 5.670	 	 3.869	 	 0.523*	 	 0.481	 	 5.670	 	 3.869	 	 0.523*	 	 0.481
	 	 (4.228)	 	 (4.075)	 	 (0.294)	 	 (0.295)	 	 (4.228)	 	 (4.075)	 	 (0.294)	 	 (0.295)
Fund	size	>$365m	 	 1.500	 	 3.110	 	 0.233	 	 0.269	 	 1.500	 	 3.110	 	 0.233	 	 0.269
	 	 (5.126)	 	 (4.898)	 	 (0.358)	 	 (0.358)	 	 (5.126)	 	 (4.898)	 	 (0.358)	 	 (0.358)
Industry	specialisation	index	 	 13.867*	 	 12.819*	 	 0.603	 	 0.552	 	 13.867*	 	 12.819*	 	 0.603	 	 0.552
	 	 (7.426)	 	 (7.097)	 	 (0.502)	 	 (0.503)	 	 (7.426)	 	 (7.097)	 	 (0.502)	 	 (0.503)
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	 	 2.660***	 	 1.873***	 	 0.158***	 	 0.161***	 	 2.660***	 	 1.873***	 	 0.158***	 	 0.161***
at	fund	vintage	 	 (0.724)	 	 (0.702)	 	 (0.048)	 	 (0.048)	 	 (0.724)	 	 (0.702)	 	 (0.048)	 	 (0.048)
Number	of	companies	invested	in	 	 -0.039	 	 -0.016	 	 -0.007	 	 -0.010	 	 -0.039	 	 -0.016	 	 -0.007	 	 -0.010
	 	 (0.105)	 	 (0.100)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.105)	 	 (0.100)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)
Average	amount	of	first	investment	made	 	 0.057	 	 -0.076	 	 0.002	 	 0.000	 	 0.057	 	 -0.076	 	 0.002	 	 0.000
	 	 (0.212)	 	 (0.202)	 	 (0.018)	 	 (0.018)	 	 (0.212)	 	 (0.202)	 	 (0.018)	 	 (0.018)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	 	 -2.808**	 	 -2.031	 	 -0.170*	 	 -0.191**	 	 -2.808**	 	 -2.031	 	 -0.170*	 	 -0.191**
a	company	 	 (1.411)	 	 (1.345)	 	 (0.089)	 	 (0.089)	 	 (1.411)	 	 (1.345)	 	 (0.089)	 	 (0.089)
Average	number	of	syndication	partners	 	 2.823***	 	 3.125***	 	 0.224***	 	 0.227***	 	 2.823***	 	 3.125***	 	 0.224***	 	 0.227***
	 	 (1.004)	 	 (0.956)	 	 (0.067)	 	 (0.067)	 	 (1.004)	 	 (0.956)	 	 (0.067)	 	 (0.067)
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage	 1.409***	 0.699*	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1.409***	 0.699*	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (0.349)	 (0.397)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.349)	 (0.397)	 	 	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage		 	 	 5.758***	 5.575***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 5.758***	 5.575***	 	 	 	
for	UK	funds	94-97^	 	 	 (2.063)	 (2.091)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2.063)	 (2.091)	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 3.890	 3.155	 	 	 	 	 	 	 3.890	 3.155	 	 	 	
for	UK	funds		98-01	 	 	 (4.478)	 (4.471)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.478)	 (4.471)	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 -1.988	 -3.861	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -1.988	 -3.861	 	 	 	
for	UK	funds	02-05	 	 	 (8.620)	 (8.671)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (8.620)	 (8.671)	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage		 	 	 3.595***	 2.689**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 3.595***	 2.689**	 	 	 	
for	US	funds	90-93	 	 	 (1.227)	 (1.235)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.227)	 (1.235)	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 8.901***	 7.692***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 8.901***	 7.692***	 	 	 	
for	US	funds	94-97	 	 	 (0.979)	 (1.031)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.979)	 (1.031)	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 0.229	 -0.429	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.229	 -0.429	 	 	 	
for	US	funds	98-01	 	 	 (0.469)	 (0.516)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.469)	 (0.516)	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	partners	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 0.096	 -0.244	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.096	 -0.244	 	 	 	
for	US	funds	02-05	 	 	 (0.576)	 (0.590)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.576)	 (0.590)	 	 	 	
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 0.033	 0.034	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.033	 0.034	 	
year	 	 	 	 	 (0.042)	 (0.044)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.042)	 (0.044)	 	
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               Net IRR                  Multiple    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage		 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.065	 -0.041	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.065	 -0.041
year	UK	94-97^	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.170)	 (0.162)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.170)	 (0.162)
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.062	 -0.024	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.062	 -0.024
year	UK	98-01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.107)	 (0.109)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.107)	 (0.109)
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.035	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.035	
year	UK	02-05	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.646)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.646)	
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.545***	 0.462**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.545***	 0.462**
year	US	90-93	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.188)	 (0.192)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.188)	 (0.192)
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.082	 -0.227	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.082	 -0.227
year	US	94-97	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.278)	 (0.269)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.278)	 (0.269)
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.017	 -0.026	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.017	 -0.026
year	US	98-01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.108)	 (0.108)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.108)	 (0.108)
GP	number	of	offices	at	fund	vintage	year	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.002	 0.041	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.002	 0.041
US	02-05	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.054)	 (0.054)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.054)	 (0.054)
Year	FE	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Stage	Controls	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes
Industry	Controls	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes
No.	of	Observations	 520	 520	 520	 520	 426	 426	 426	 426	 520	 520	 520	 520	 426	 426	 426	 426
R-Squared	 0.316	 0.390	 0.405	 0.457	 0.290	 0.409	 0.304	 0.419	 0.316	 0.390	 0.405	 0.457	 0.290	 0.409	 0.304	 0.419
^	No	data	on	the	number	of	partners	and	offices	were	available	for	the	fund	managers	of	the	UK-based	funds	raised	in	the	1990-1993	period.
Note: Columns	1-2	examine	the	effect	of	GP	partners	with	and	without	controls,	while	columns	3-4	look	at	the	effect	of	partners	over	time	on	funds	in	the	US	
and	the	UK.	Columns	5-8	repeat	the	analysis	looking	at	the	number	of	offices	of	the	GP.	Size	variables	refer	to	quartiles	of	the	size	distribution	with	the	bottom	
quartile	omitted	as	a	reference	quartile.	The	regression	models	in	this	table	have	been	estimated	with	OLS.	The	table	reports	standard	errors	in	parentheses	
clustered	at	the	fund	manager	level.	*,	**,	***	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	The	right	panel	
reproduces	the	same	regressions	but	considering	multiples	instead	of	net	IRR	as	dependent	variable.	
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Table A11: Public-private	performance	gap
      Net IRR           Multiple  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
UK	based	fund	 -4.031	 -6.286**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.248*	 -0.377***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (3.257)	 (2.996)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.148)	 (0.143)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
UK-based	fund	raised	1990-1993	 	 	 -17.626***	-16.031***	-16.943***	-15.941**	 -14.284**	 -15.491**	 -19.101***	-11.114**	 	 	 -1.223***	 -1.114***	 -1.167***	 -1.057**	 -0.981**	 -1.069**	 -1.218***	 -0.847**
	 	 	 (6.470)	 (5.886)	 (5.859)	 (6.956)	 (6.679)	 (6.941)	 (6.678)	 (5.309)	 	 	 (0.424)	 (0.383)	 (0.383)	 (0.422)	 (0.406)	 (0.425)	 (0.419)	 (0.343)
UK-based	fund	raised	1994-1997	 	 	 -17.943*	 -17.629*	 -18.072*	 -15.945*	 -15.655*	 -14.317*	 -17.512**	 -10.299	 	 	 -0.972**	 -0.951**	 -0.969**	 -0.891**	 -0.894**	 -0.828**	 -0.960**	 -0.622*
	 	 	 (9.966)	 (9.681)	 (9.525)	 (9.555)	 (8.765)	 (8.546)	 (8.725)	 (7.703)	 	 	 (0.462)	 (0.452)	 (0.444)	 (0.421)	 (0.390)	 (0.385)	 (0.395)	 (0.346)
UK-based	fund	raised	1998-2001	 	 	 1.537	 2.376	 2.720	 3.992	 4.897*	 5.665*	 2.890	 3.857	 	 	 0.013	 0.067	 0.078	 0.116	 0.174	 0.210	 0.096	 0.114
	 	 	 (2.834)	 (2.724)	 (2.768)	 (2.948)	 (2.695)	 (2.967)	 (3.029)	 (3.225)	 	 	 (0.116)	 (0.119)	 (0.132)	 (0.145)	 (0.144)	 (0.160)	 (0.167)	 (0.171)
UK-based	fund	raised	2002-2005	 	 	 -1.438	 -2.007	 -1.502	 1.245	 0.879	 2.651	 -0.442	 -2.586	 	 	 -0.002	 -0.030	 0.021	 0.134	 0.111	 0.198	 0.070	 -0.072
	 	 	 (3.788)	 (4.269)	 (4.667)	 (4.321)	 (4.920)	 (5.610)	 (5.991)	 (6.755)	 	 	 (0.143)	 (0.192)	 (0.214)	 (0.207)	 (0.242)	 (0.264)	 (0.283)	 (0.291)
Fund	size	$85m-$191m	 	 	 	 6.010*	 6.268**	 5.942*	 4.101	 3.295	 1.945	 1.392	 	 	 	 0.450**	 0.476***	 0.455**	 0.363**	 0.329*	 0.273*	 0.232
	 	 	 	 (3.116)	 (3.175)	 (3.172)	 (3.151)	 (3.011)	 (2.967)	 (2.973)	 	 	 	 (0.178)	 (0.182)	 (0.180)	 (0.173)	 (0.169)	 (0.166)	 (0.165)
Fund	size	$191m-$365m	 	 	 	 7.054**	 7.479**	 7.023**	 3.158	 2.257	 -0.105	 0.208	 	 	 	 0.462**	 0.511***	 0.487**	 0.293*	 0.273	 0.175	 0.170
	 	 	 	 (3.467)	 (3.545)	 (3.474)	 (3.108)	 (3.219)	 (3.242)	 (3.164)	 	 	 	 (0.190)	 (0.197)	 (0.193)	 (0.169)	 (0.174)	 (0.172)	 (0.168)
Fund	size	>$365m	 	 	 	 5.851**	 6.553**	 6.096**	 0.034	 -1.444	 -4.559	 -2.773	 	 	 	 0.279**	 0.359**	 0.319**	 0.012	 -0.013	 -0.142	 -0.081
	 	 	 	 (2.830)	 (3.034)	 (3.091)	 (2.917)	 (3.173)	 (3.379)	 (3.136)	 	 	 	 (0.133)	 (0.148)	 (0.150)	 (0.146)	 (0.152)	 (0.156)	 (0.151)
Industry	specialisation	index	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.116	 4.206	 3.193	 3.974	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.354	 0.316	 0.274	 0.305
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5.100)	 (4.918)	 (4.758)	 (4.887)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.273)	 (0.257)	 (0.248)	 (0.257)
Experience	of	GP	relative	to	the	market	at	 	 	 	 	 	 	 2.079***	 1.961***	 1.936***	 1.460**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.111***	 0.107***	 0.106***	 0.081**
fund	vintage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.587)	 (0.623)	 (0.603)	 (0.594)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.032)	 (0.034)	 (0.033)	 (0.032)
Number	of	companies	invested	in	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.048	 0.062	 0.042	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.000	 0.000	 -0.001
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.095)	 (0.094)	 (0.090)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
Average	amount	of	first	investment	made	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.020	 0.002	 -0.172	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.001	 0.000	 -0.009
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.120)	 (0.122)	 (0.147)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)
Average	round	of	first	investment	into	a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -2.407**	 -2.397**	 -3.321***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.127**	 -0.127**	 -0.171***
company	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.119)	 (1.071)	 (1.178)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.057)	 (0.056)	 (0.055)
Average	number	of	syndication	partners	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1.661	 1.396	 1.182	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.096*	 0.085*	 0.072
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.008)	 (0.972)	 (1.006)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.051)	 (0.049)	 (0.051)
Hub	dummy	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 7.226***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.298**	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2.247)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.119)	
Share	of	IPO	exits	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 58.543***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 3.054***
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (10.166)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.604)
Share	of	M&A	exits	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 10.549	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.460
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (6.447)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.300)
Public	hub	 -7.397***	 -3.216	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.346***	 -0.062	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (2.739)	 (2.443)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.127)	 (0.117)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Public	fund	UK	94-97^	 	 	 -20.826**	 -17.412**	 -17.154**	 -17.421**	 -17.200**	 -18.812**	 -16.635*	 -18.441**	 	 	 -0.736	 -0.519	 -0.564	 -0.587	 -0.538	 -0.600	 -0.510	 -0.586
	 	 	 (9.224)	 (8.802)	 (8.711)	 (8.808)	 (8.178)	 (8.138)	 (8.532)	 (7.369)	 	 	 (0.451)	 (0.440)	 (0.434)	 -0.422	 (0.393)	 (0.399)	 (0.414)	 (0.358)
Public	fund	UK	98-01	 	 	 -3.374	 -0.194	 -0.096	 -0.744	 -0.611	 -1.827	 -1.462	 -4.417	 	 	 -0.093	 0.071	 0.091	 0.072	 0.099	 0.056	 0.071	 -0.078
	 	 	 (3.031)	 (3.173)	 (3.414)	 (3.698)	 (3.522)	 (3.556)	 (3.620)	 (4.102)	 	 	 (0.141)	 (0.167)	 (0.184)	 (0.200)	 (0.200)	 (0.203)	 (0.204)	 (0.236)
Public	fund	UK	02-05	 	 	 -2.239	 1.712	 1.266	 0.437	 -1.186	 -2.078	 -1.394	 1.519	 	 	 -0.066	 0.160	 0.070	 0.043	 -0.028	 -0.057	 -0.029	 0.123
	 	 	 (3.885)	 (4.788)	 (5.228)	 (4.873)	 (5.346)	 (5.784)	 (6.149)	 (7.149)	 	 	 (0.139)	 (0.210)	 (0.237)	 (0.226)	 (0.259)	 (0.270)	 (0.290)	 (0.319)
Public	fund	US	90-93	 	 	 -13.184**	 -9.028	 -9.670*	 -9.260	 -5.236	 -5.386	 -2.737	 -7.504	 	 	 -1.386***	 -1.091**	 -1.104***	 -0.966**	 -0.775*	 -0.798*	 -0.688	 -0.895**
	 	 	 (5.706)	 (5.766)	 (5.788)	 (5.970)	 (5.970)	 (6.028)	 (6.310)	 (6.358)	 	 	 (0.447)	 (0.427)	 (0.425)	 (0.437)	 (0.430)	 (0.427)	 (0.442)	 (0.442)
Public	fund	US	94-97	 	 	 -10.235	 -9.737	 -9.527	 -10.122	 -6.021	 -4.553	 -5.252	 -0.347	 	 	 -0.364	 -0.345	 -0.351	 -0.365	 -0.147	 -0.056	 -0.085	 0.159
	 	 	 (15.870)	 (15.249)	 (15.016)	 (15.001)	 (15.399)	 (14.240)	 (14.093)	 (13.673)	 	 	 (0.776)	 (0.739)	 (0.729)	 (0.696)	 (0.704)	 (0.647)	 (0.645)	 (0.629)
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      Net IRR           Multiple  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Public	fund	US	98-01	 	 	 2.459	 2.512	 3.732	 3.990	 5.844	 6.221	 6.215	 6.309	 	 	 0.167	 0.128	 0.261	 0.284	 0.395*	 0.442*	 0.441*	 0.450*
	 	 	 (3.114)	 (3.414)	 (3.807)	 (3.953)	 (4.183)	 (4.332)	 (4.594)	 (4.144)	 	 	 (0.179)	 (0.190)	 (0.215)	 (0.219)	 (0.235)	 (0.242)	 (0.253)	 (0.232)
Public	fund	US	02-05	 	 	 -5.678**	 -5.714**	 -5.229*	 -4.432	 -4.718	 -3.924	 -2.485	 -3.383	 	 	 -0.222***	 -0.279**	 -0.219*	 -0.185	 -0.193	 -0.142	 -0.083	 -0.119
	 	 	 (2.473)	 (2.796)	 (2.826)	 (2.996)	 (2.985)	 (3.012)	 (2.949)	 (2.868)	 	 	 (0.076)	 (0.113)	 (0.118)	 (0.143)	 (0.138)	 (0.134)	 (0.135)	 (0.131)
Year	FE	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Stage	Controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Industry	Controls	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
No.	of	Observations	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791	 791
R-Squared	 0.012	 0.245	 0.264	 0.271	 0.274	 0.290	 0.306	 0.314	 0.325	 0.354	 0.011	 0.228	 0.246	 0.257	 0.265	 0.282	 0.299	 0.306	 0.313	 0.345
^	No	data	performance	data	was	available	for	UK-based	funds	with	public	backing	raised	in	the	1990-1993	period	
Note:	Columns	1	and	2	examine	the	underperformance	of	publicly	backed	funds	with	and	without	controlling	for	the	fund	vintage	year.	Columns	3-10	look	at	
the	relative	performance	of	public	funds	in	the	UK	and	US	over	time	as	different	controls	are	introduced.	Size	variables	refer	to	quartiles	of	the	size	distribution	
with	the	bottom	quartile	omitted	as	a	reference	quartile.	The	regression	models	in	this	table	have	been	estimated	with	OLS.	The	table	reports	standard	errors	in	
parentheses	clustered	at	the	fund	manager	level.	*,	**,	***	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10	per	cent,	5	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	level	respectively.	The	
right	panel	reproduces	the	same	regressions	but	considering	multiples	instead	of	net	IRR	as	dependent	variable.
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